Damn it! Along with the rest of the Texas Electronic Privacy Coalition, I'd hoped this would be Texas: From the May 30th Maine Sunday Telegram, "Maine cellphone-privacy law is America's first." Their story opened:Maine's Legislature is poised to become the first in the nation to enact a law requiring police to obtain warrants to get the location history for people's cellphones.The House voted 113-28 on Wednesday to pass the measure, following its passage in the Senate last week by a margin of five votes. The bill now goes back to the Senate for enactment.Apparently, though, it's not completely a done deal. Ryan Gallagher at Slate reported that:For the Maine legislation, there’s just one more challenge ahead. While the Senate has already voted in support of the bill, 20-15, local news reports have speculated that unless the legislature can find funding for LD 415’s fiscal note of almost $234,000 during the next two years, final enactment could fall through.The lopsided margin of support in the Maine House of Representatives reminded me of the dynamic on our cell-phone location legislation here in Texas. Notably, the vote in the Texas House in favor of an amendment to require warrants for cell-phone location data won by a phenomenal 126-4 margin. But the authors of the bill it was attached to, Rep. John Frullo and Sen. John Carona, killed it with a procedural maneuver and sent a version to the Governor without requiring warrants for cell-phone location data, though we did of course get first-in-the-nation amendment tacked on to require warrants for cloud-based email and other stored communications.Congrats to the advocates and legislators in Maine who pulled this off and I hope the funding comes through. With a little luck, perhaps in 2015 Texas will follow your lead. Would have been awfully sweet to get that this session, though. We came darn close. To my mind, the warrants-for-email bill is a nice but insufficient consolation prize compared to what Maine has accomplished.
Texas blows opportunity to lead nation on cell-phone privacy
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CA11: A warrant's “catch-all provision” that on its face makes a search warrant overbroad is severable
A warrant's “catch-all provision” that on its face makes a search warrant overbroad is severable from the warrant under Andresen. “Accordingly, the warrant was not so facially deficient that the executing officers could not have reasonably presumed it was valid.” Therefore, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Carson, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10979 (11th Cir. May 31, 2013).*
Walking away from an officer is not a submission to authority. There was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop. United States v. Jones, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76505 (E.D. N.C. May 29, 2013).*
Review of the affidavit for search warrant on a motion to suppress is not de novo: is there a substantial basis for believing PC? United States v. Deprow, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76811 (E.D. Mo. May 3, 2013).*
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How many cases besides Winfrey hinged on bogus dog-scent lineups? Forensic commission should check
In an article also appearing in the New York Times, the Texas Tribune's Brandi Grissom has a feature today about Megan Winfrey, whose conviction was finally overturned by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in February because of junk science (dog-scent lineups) used to convict her. Winfrey is not eligible for compensation, Grissom pointed out, because her case was not overturned on formal "actual innocence" grounds, so her only recourse after spending seven years in prison based on the junkiest of junk science would be to sue. Her brother, who was charged and acquitted in the same case but in the meantime spent 2.5 years in jail, has already done so.If Governor Perry signs SB 1238 expanding the jurisdiction of the Forensic Science Commission to take up investigations for "educational purposes," IMO these old scent lineup cases deserve a closer review by that body. Nobody knows for sure in how many nor in which cases Fort Bend County Sheriff's Deputy Keith Pikett performed these bogus rituals, nor how often he testified in court. The FSC would be performing a great mitzvah by investigating once and for all just how deep that rabbit hole goes. Maybe it's just a few cases where Pikett provided the primary evidence; maybe it's dozens or hundreds. There's no way to know unless someone systematically investigates, which has never been done.On the Winfrey case, see also the majority opinion by Judge Cathy Cochran overturning Winfrey's conviction and a dissent by Presiding Judge Sharon Keller, as well as prior Grits posts on the Winfrey case and dog-sniff lineups generally:Nuther dog-scent lineup case overturned; how many more are out there? Woman still incarcerated based on Keith Pikett dog-scent testimony 'As good as DNA'? Court of Criminal Appeals consider dog-scent lineups Woman still jailed on dog-scent evidence granted high court hearing Appellate court upholds exclusion of dog-scent lineup evidence Time to ban junk science from the courtroom Dog scent lineups discredited at Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Texas needs process to vet cases based on forensic hokum Deputy famous for dog-scent lineups to retire More detail on scent-lineup case headed to Texas CCATexas Court of Criminal Appeals will hear arguments on dog scent evidenceMore litigation, disapprobation for dog-scent lineups'Scent lineup' evidence may be used in Anthony Graves capital caseCNN profiles cop wrongly accused by dog scent lineupA 'scent lineup'? Rover in the witness boxDNA exoneration indicts Rover in the witness box'Scent lineups stink to critics'3 false convictions relied on dog-based scent lineups in FloridaScent lineups by dogs don't pass the smell testTexas Innocence Project vetting dog scent lineup casesEvidence mounts against dog handler, scent lineupsTexas Innocence Project report discredits dog 'scent lineups'
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One Big DWI Red Flag: Driving a Mechanically Defective Vehicle While Drunk Behind the Wheel
There are few things that will get the attention of a New Jersey State Trooper or local patrolman faster than a motorist operating a vehicle that is obviously damaged, in poor repair, or incorrectly maintained. As such, there are few worse scenarios than attempting to drive a mechanically compromised automobile when you as the driver are also somewhat compromised by alcohol (DWI), prescription meds (drug DUI), or an illegal substance (also known as a controlled dangerous substance or CDS).
Furthermore, it doesn't take a skilled legal professional to know that here in the Garden State, being arrested for DWI or drug DUI is not the best path to a happy future. Aside from the general embarrassment, potential negative career implications, or interpersonal problems that such an event can trigger, the cost of a conviction for drunken driving can be rather significant, especially for those individuals who already have tight family budgets.
All this being said, there are ways to avoid attracting the attention of the local constabulary. First and foremost is not getting into the driver's seat after having even one drink. Whether you are below the legal limit of 0.08 percent blood-alcohol content (BAC) or not, being even slightly impaired can raise your chances of having an accident by affecting one's ability to control the vehicle; never mind the possibility of standing out in a crowd by weaving, failing to signal, speeding, or even going much too slowly.
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Case o' The Week: Ninth Constrains Plain Bane -- Joseph and Plain Error Review for Sentencing Mistakes
Should an appellate court correct a sentencing error, when the mistake means our client is doing more jail time than necessary?![]()
The Hon. Richard Paez Sad to have to even ask the question – but happy to tout the Ninth’s answer. United States v. Dayven Joseph,2013 WL 2321443 (9thCir. May 29, 2013), decision available here.Players: Decision by Judge Paez. Nice Win by Hawai’i AFPD Alexander Silvert, FPD Peter Wolff and AFPD Donna Gray. Facts: While serving a term in federal prison, Joseph was caught with marijuana. Id.at *1. When the FBI interrogated him, Joseph admitted to possessing marijuana inside on a different date as well, and giving some to another inmate. Id. He was indicted with three counts of 18 USC § 1791: i) possessing marijuana in December, ii) giving that marijuana to another inmate in December, and iii) possessing marijuana in February. Joseph plead guilty, and the PSR recommended consecutive sentences for the three counts under Section 1791(c): “the term of imprisonment shall be imposed to run consecutive to any other sentence imposed for offenses involving acontrolled substance.” Id. (emphasis added). The district court imposed three sentences, one for each count, consecutive to one another. Id. at *2. The defense did not object. Issue(s): “Joseph argues that ‘such a controlled substance’ refers only to the specific item of drugs that provided the basis for the violation of § 1791(a) . . . . In contrast, the Government argues that ‘such a controlled substance’ in § 1791(c) refers to any controlled substance, irrespective of whether it was the specific item of drugs or even the same type of drug that formed the basis for the violation of § 1791(a).” Id. at *3. Held: “Joseph’s reading of § 1791(c) is the only plausible interpretation that comports with the text of the statute and congressional intent.” Id. “In sum, we hold that the first provision of § 1791(c) – “[a]ny punishment imposed under sub-section (b) for a violation of this section involving a controlled substance shall be consecutive to any other sentence imposed in any court for an offense involving such a controlled substance” – only requires consecutive sentences when there is more than one conviction resulting from the same item of controlled substance contraband. Therefore it was error for the district court to assume that the statute required the sentence for Count 4 be imposed consecutively to Counts 1 and 2.” Id. at *5. Of Note: This is a sweet win on a rarely-charged criminal statute. Joseph’s greater value, however, is as useful synthesis of plain error review for sentencing mistakes. Id. at *5. You’ll recall that plain error review is that hated hurdle that protects district court mistakes through a series of difficult hoops. Here, Judge Paez has no problem finding that the district court’s “consecutive” error was plain – even though “there was no appellate law case law answering this precise question.” Id.“[T]he clear text and structure of the statute, along with the Sentencing Guidelines, are sufficient to show that the error was ‘plain.’” Id. Joseph’s application of the plain error test is one to quote, as are the opinion’s dissection of the other plain error prongs in the context of sentencing appeals. Id. at *6. A welcome addition to appellate counsel’s tool-kit.How to Use: The best way to win a plain error fight is to avoid a plain error flight altogether. In fat footnote four, Judge Paez carefully explains that the Court’s plain error review wasn’t actually necessary in Joseph because this was a purely legal issue and there was no prejudice to the government by the failure of the defense to object. Id. at *2 & n.4. Whether to apply plain error when reviewing a purely legal issue is still a big fight – three years ago a visiting Senior Judge seriously muddied some settled Ninth law on the issue. See blog entry here. Always start your plain error fight by trying hard to avoid the plain error fight – footnote four is a critical important caveat in the Josephanalysis. For Further Reading: We worry when Senior, out-of-circuit judges muck with Ninth law – except when we like their decisions. For example, last November visiting Sixth Circuit Judge Ronald Gilman tackled the troubling Maloney decision in a wonderful dissent. See Maloney blog entry here. Just how compelling was Judge Gilman's dissent? Maloneywent en banc last week. See order here. Image of The Honorable Richard Paez from http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/immigration/article_775e264c-e082-11df-b656-001cc4c03286.htmlSteven Kalar, Federal Public Defender ND Cal. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org.
The Hon. Richard Paez Sad to have to even ask the question – but happy to tout the Ninth’s answer. United States v. Dayven Joseph,2013 WL 2321443 (9thCir. May 29, 2013), decision available here.Players: Decision by Judge Paez. Nice Win by Hawai’i AFPD Alexander Silvert, FPD Peter Wolff and AFPD Donna Gray. Facts: While serving a term in federal prison, Joseph was caught with marijuana. Id.at *1. When the FBI interrogated him, Joseph admitted to possessing marijuana inside on a different date as well, and giving some to another inmate. Id. He was indicted with three counts of 18 USC § 1791: i) possessing marijuana in December, ii) giving that marijuana to another inmate in December, and iii) possessing marijuana in February. Joseph plead guilty, and the PSR recommended consecutive sentences for the three counts under Section 1791(c): “the term of imprisonment shall be imposed to run consecutive to any other sentence imposed for offenses involving acontrolled substance.” Id. (emphasis added). The district court imposed three sentences, one for each count, consecutive to one another. Id. at *2. The defense did not object. Issue(s): “Joseph argues that ‘such a controlled substance’ refers only to the specific item of drugs that provided the basis for the violation of § 1791(a) . . . . In contrast, the Government argues that ‘such a controlled substance’ in § 1791(c) refers to any controlled substance, irrespective of whether it was the specific item of drugs or even the same type of drug that formed the basis for the violation of § 1791(a).” Id. at *3. Held: “Joseph’s reading of § 1791(c) is the only plausible interpretation that comports with the text of the statute and congressional intent.” Id. “In sum, we hold that the first provision of § 1791(c) – “[a]ny punishment imposed under sub-section (b) for a violation of this section involving a controlled substance shall be consecutive to any other sentence imposed in any court for an offense involving such a controlled substance” – only requires consecutive sentences when there is more than one conviction resulting from the same item of controlled substance contraband. Therefore it was error for the district court to assume that the statute required the sentence for Count 4 be imposed consecutively to Counts 1 and 2.” Id. at *5. Of Note: This is a sweet win on a rarely-charged criminal statute. Joseph’s greater value, however, is as useful synthesis of plain error review for sentencing mistakes. Id. at *5. You’ll recall that plain error review is that hated hurdle that protects district court mistakes through a series of difficult hoops. Here, Judge Paez has no problem finding that the district court’s “consecutive” error was plain – even though “there was no appellate law case law answering this precise question.” Id.“[T]he clear text and structure of the statute, along with the Sentencing Guidelines, are sufficient to show that the error was ‘plain.’” Id. Joseph’s application of the plain error test is one to quote, as are the opinion’s dissection of the other plain error prongs in the context of sentencing appeals. Id. at *6. A welcome addition to appellate counsel’s tool-kit.How to Use: The best way to win a plain error fight is to avoid a plain error flight altogether. In fat footnote four, Judge Paez carefully explains that the Court’s plain error review wasn’t actually necessary in Joseph because this was a purely legal issue and there was no prejudice to the government by the failure of the defense to object. Id. at *2 & n.4. Whether to apply plain error when reviewing a purely legal issue is still a big fight – three years ago a visiting Senior Judge seriously muddied some settled Ninth law on the issue. See blog entry here. Always start your plain error fight by trying hard to avoid the plain error fight – footnote four is a critical important caveat in the Josephanalysis. For Further Reading: We worry when Senior, out-of-circuit judges muck with Ninth law – except when we like their decisions. For example, last November visiting Sixth Circuit Judge Ronald Gilman tackled the troubling Maloney decision in a wonderful dissent. See Maloney blog entry here. Just how compelling was Judge Gilman's dissent? Maloneywent en banc last week. See order here. Image of The Honorable Richard Paez from http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/immigration/article_775e264c-e082-11df-b656-001cc4c03286.htmlSteven Kalar, Federal Public Defender ND Cal. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org.
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Waiting for Helen (A Short Story)
I am searching for the perfect woman. I am reading an article on ancient Greece, and I am studying the glossy pages for a picture of Helen of Troy. I need to know what she looked like. My girlfriend Ellen is fretting about our hotel reservations and the quality of our accommodations. She is convinced [...]
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Undocumented Immigrants Can Get Driver’s Licenses in Some States
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Suspect accused of two crimes
In this particular matter the defendant has been separately charged and convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as a result of incidents that occurred approximately an hour apart. One of the incidents occurred in Bronx County and the other occurred in New York County.
The defendant contends that second degree possession is a continuing crime and that his later New York County conviction must be set aside on double grounds jeopardy.
Case Background
The charges against the defendant arise from an incident where he went to the apartment of his estranged wife late one night with the intent of killing her because he believed that she was having an affair with his son from a previous marriage.
The police arrived in answer to a call, but before they could stop the defendant he shot his wife three times with a .38 caliber pistol then fled out a window and down a fire escape to his waiting car.
Once the defendant was in his car he headed for his son’s apartment with the intent of shooting him as well. He abandoned this idea before he reached his son’s apartment and decided to return to his own home and kill himself.
The defendant reached his apartment about an hour after the killing to find the police waiting in the hall outside. The officers ordered him to freeze, but he tried to escape and in the process pulled out his gun and aimed it at one of the officers.
Before the defendant could fire a shot the officers shot and wounded him and then placed him under arrest. Ballistics tests revealed that the gun that they had taken from the defendant by the police was the one that he had used to shoot his wife and that he had reloaded it after killing her.
Case Discussion
The crimes of second and third degree criminal possession of a weapon are very different. Third degree criminal possession of a weapon is in reference to dominion and control. Second degree criminal possession requires a specific intent.
The defendant was indicted in Bronx County for murder in the second degree, criminal use of a weapon in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree for the shooting of his wife.
While the case was proceeding in Bronx County, the defendant was indicted in New York County for second and third degree criminal possession of a weapon based on his threatened use of the handgun against the police officers at his Manhattan apartment.
Court Decision
The court has reviewed the facts of the case and has determined that the double jeopardy laws do apply in this matter. For this reason, the defendant cannot be prosecuted in New York County for criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
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Maryland Marijuana Citation FAQ
This content originally came from Baum Law Offices, LLC - Attorney Matthew Baum - Serving clients in Maryland and DC.At the start of 2013, Maryland police officers began issuing criminal citations to persons charged with possessing less than 10 grams of marijuana. Prior to 2013, people charged with possessing any amount of marijuana in the state of Maryland were … Continue reading →The post Maryland Marijuana Citation FAQ appeared first on Baum Law Offices, LLC - Attorney Matthew Baum. It was originally written by Matthew Baum.
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Driving on Suspended – Three Options
If you’re facing a driving on suspended charge, you have options. Here are three of them: 1. Ignore it. You can certainly ignore your charge and hope that it will go away. However, it’s not going to happen. If you simply don’t go to court and ignore the fact that you’re charged with driving on [...]
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Possession of Marijuana – Options for Your Case
If you’re charged with possession of marijuana in Virginia, you have options about how to handle the case. Some choices may be better than others, and that’s what we’ll explore together. 1. Ignore it. If you’re facing a Virginia possession of marijuana charge, one option you have would be to simply ignore the charge completely [...]
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ND - Sex offenders clustered in Fargo’s core
Original Article
06/01/2013
By Emily Welker
Concentration in low-income areas brings risks, expert says
FARGO - Heidi Laho was packing last week to move her five small children, her...
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Residential Search held Invalid by Appellate Court
The First District Court of Appeals, which includes Pensacola, Escambia, Santa Rosa, Okaloosa and Walton Counties, issued a favorable opinion upholding the Fourth Amendment rights of a homeowner against unreasonable searches and seizures this last week. In Powell v. State, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D1140a (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) the issue was whether police officers entering Powell’s property and peering into a window of his mobile home late at night after receiving an anonymous tip an hour earlier that marijuana plants were inside was a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.
The appellate court held that the officers' intrusion into the curtilage of the mobile home, on a part of the property on which they had no legal right to be, and peering through a window a hand's length away at a sharp angle into an otherwise private part of the home, constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment under both the expectation of privacy test and the intrusion test.
Either way, this entry into the protected private space of the home was an improper attempt to verify an anonymous tip. The court reversed the convictions, which were based entirely on evidence obtained due to the unlawful search. The First DCA reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and it is likely that ultimately all evidence in Mr. Powell's case will be suppressed and the case will have to be dismissed by the prosecutor's office.
I wrote an lengthy article that was published in the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Magazine a while back about law enforcement being in a place and obtaining incriminating evidence when they had no right to be on the defendant't property when they observed the evidence and obtained an alleged incriminating statement from my client. The name of the article is "Defining the Amorphous World of Curtilage for Fourth Amendment Purposes" and can be read by clicking the hyperlink of the articles name. The article goes into detail about what law enforcement officers can and cannot do when attempting to obtain incriminating evidence when entering upon a citizen's residential property.
If we can be of help to you with the issue of search and seizure, be it in a residential setting, automobile search or even a personal physical search please contact us at M. James Jenkins and Associates. Again, if you are approached by law enforcement, under any of these circumstances it is generally best to politely refuse to speak to the officers until you have sought the advice of legal counsel. (There are certain times when you may not legally refuse a search, for example if law enforcement has a search warrant, or if they have probable cause to search your car or your person. However, often refusing to allow law enforcement to search when the search or the questioned posed to you can be voluntarily answered, sometimes refusing to acquiesce or "just give in" with what ever the officer asks you to do, will make the difference between being arrested and not being arrested. We are here to help you and be your advocates to ensure everything is done to protect your rights and the rights of all law abiding citizens.
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Search Incident to Arrest
It seems like the government can search just about anything these days, as long as they can find a judge to sign a search warrant. But, the police may also search a citizen's belongings without a warrant, under certain conditions. Today, we're going briefly discuss one exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, searches incident to arrest.
It makes sense that the police should be able to search a person before he is placed into to county jail. After all, they don't want folks bringing guns or drugs into the jail. But what is not so obvious is, how far can a search go once the person is arrested and we know they're on their way to jail? May they search your entire car? May they search your cell phone? Let's find out.
Historically, the most common search incident to an arrest was the search of a defendant's car. Basically, if you were arrested for something as simple as driving on a suspended license, the police were permitted to search your entire vehicle after the arrest. Now you may ask yourself, why? Is it physically possible for a person who is handcuffed, sitting in the back of a patrol car, to access their potentially dangerous belongings within their car? Nope. It's not.
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Missouri lawmakers move to toughen sexual violence laws
6-2-2013 Missouri:
Several measures aimed at strengthening Missouri's sex offender laws are in front of Gov. Jay Nixon, including an effort to lengthen prison sentences.
One proposal advanced...
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New Obama Administration “Senior Reward” Program Could Lead to Many New Los Angeles Medicare Fraud Cases
On April 24, 2013, the Obama Administration announced a spectacular new “Senior Reward” program, which could spur many new additional Southern California Medicare fraud cases. ![senior-los-angeles-medicare-fraud.jpg]()
The so-called Senior Medicare Patrol would offer whistleblowers up to $10 million for exposing fraud. The whistleblower would get 15% of the recovered funds. This is a huge change to the current HHS model, which offers a 10% reward of up to $1,000. The revised program is modeled after an IRS program, which has helped that agency collect nearly $2 billion in fraud over the past 10 years.
Since 1997, the Senior Medicare Patrol has generated 7,000 plus referrals to the Office of the Inspector General and the CMS. In just the last three years alone, the Obama Administration has cracked down hard and managed to re-collect nearly $15 billion stolen from Medicare’s coffers. Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, stated the President’s intentions in clear language: “President Obama has made the elimination of fraud, waste and abuse, particularly in healthcare, a top priority for the administration.”
The big is question is: will this massive spike in incentive (from $1,000 to nearly $10 million!) make a big difference, in terms of generating better Southern California Medicare fraud cases and repairing the broken system?
It seems like it should, right? Isn’t it obvious that a reward of $10 million would attract a more vigorous response than a reward of $1,000?
Yes and no.
As motivation researcher, Dan Ariely, recently discussed in a very popular TED talk, the “stuff” that motivates human behavior (such as whistleblowing) is often highly counterintuitive. When a powerful purpose drives motivation, people often work extremely hard, often for free or for very little money. On the other hand, if a monetary incentive exists but the purpose behind the incentive is lacking, the cash reward may not motivate and may, in fact, DE-motivate.
Of course, most criminal cash rewards are tied into purposeful activity. For instance, when the FBI puts bounties on terrorists, people may be motivated to nab the terrorist not just for the money but also to fulfill a strong moral imperative (or purpose).
Similarly, when someone turns in IRS cheaters or people who've committed Los Angeles healthcare fraud, they will likely enjoy more than just a monetary reward -- they'll also get a feeling of serving a greater purpose (e.g. helping fix our skewed healthcare system).
Of course, as someone facing charges of healthcare fraud, credit card fraud, or other Southern California white collar crimes, you're probably less concerned about the overarching utility (or lack thereof) of motivational schemes to inspire whistleblowers and more worried about what's going to happen to you, your family, and your practice because of the charges against you.
Knowledge is power. The team here at the Kraut Law Group has the resources and track record to give you insights into your case and build a strong, ethical, and aggressive defense. Mr. Kraut is not exactly known as a “softie” on crime. In fact, he spent a substantial part of his career (14 plus years) as a hardnosed prosecutor for the city before becoming a criminal defense lawyer.
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The so-called Senior Medicare Patrol would offer whistleblowers up to $10 million for exposing fraud. The whistleblower would get 15% of the recovered funds. This is a huge change to the current HHS model, which offers a 10% reward of up to $1,000. The revised program is modeled after an IRS program, which has helped that agency collect nearly $2 billion in fraud over the past 10 years.
Since 1997, the Senior Medicare Patrol has generated 7,000 plus referrals to the Office of the Inspector General and the CMS. In just the last three years alone, the Obama Administration has cracked down hard and managed to re-collect nearly $15 billion stolen from Medicare’s coffers. Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, stated the President’s intentions in clear language: “President Obama has made the elimination of fraud, waste and abuse, particularly in healthcare, a top priority for the administration.”
The big is question is: will this massive spike in incentive (from $1,000 to nearly $10 million!) make a big difference, in terms of generating better Southern California Medicare fraud cases and repairing the broken system?
It seems like it should, right? Isn’t it obvious that a reward of $10 million would attract a more vigorous response than a reward of $1,000?
Yes and no.
As motivation researcher, Dan Ariely, recently discussed in a very popular TED talk, the “stuff” that motivates human behavior (such as whistleblowing) is often highly counterintuitive. When a powerful purpose drives motivation, people often work extremely hard, often for free or for very little money. On the other hand, if a monetary incentive exists but the purpose behind the incentive is lacking, the cash reward may not motivate and may, in fact, DE-motivate.
Of course, most criminal cash rewards are tied into purposeful activity. For instance, when the FBI puts bounties on terrorists, people may be motivated to nab the terrorist not just for the money but also to fulfill a strong moral imperative (or purpose).
Similarly, when someone turns in IRS cheaters or people who've committed Los Angeles healthcare fraud, they will likely enjoy more than just a monetary reward -- they'll also get a feeling of serving a greater purpose (e.g. helping fix our skewed healthcare system).
Of course, as someone facing charges of healthcare fraud, credit card fraud, or other Southern California white collar crimes, you're probably less concerned about the overarching utility (or lack thereof) of motivational schemes to inspire whistleblowers and more worried about what's going to happen to you, your family, and your practice because of the charges against you.
Knowledge is power. The team here at the Kraut Law Group has the resources and track record to give you insights into your case and build a strong, ethical, and aggressive defense. Mr. Kraut is not exactly known as a “softie” on crime. In fact, he spent a substantial part of his career (14 plus years) as a hardnosed prosecutor for the city before becoming a criminal defense lawyer.
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Doubt Grows for Death Row Inmate’s Guilt
Last month, the Innocence Project and lead counsel for a Florida death row inmate presented compelling new evidence for overturning his conviction in a hearing in Sanford. Clemente Javier Aguirre-Jarquin has been on Florida's death row since 2006 for the murders of a mother and daughter who were found stabbed to death in their trailer in Seminole County on June 17, 2004. Now, as the County Circuit Judge considers the evidence before ruling sometime this month, the Tampa Bay Times reports that doubt of Aguirre's guilt has grown.
The evidence that could potentially save Aguirre's life comes at a time when Florida is trying to pass legislation called the Timely Justice Act that would speed up executions across the state.
"I think (Aguirre-Jarquin) is very lucky that it only took six years to prove his innocence and not 15 or 20," said Nina Morrison, senior staff attorney for the Innocence Project, which assisted with the case's DNA testing. "Under the provisions of the Timely Justice Act, he might not be alive today."
The new evidence points to Aguirre's innocence and points to the victim's daughter, who has a long history of mental illness, as the real perpetrator. According to Morrison, police and prosecutors developed a theory of the crime early on and rushed to judgment.
"I think Clemente's case is a sobering reminder that innocence doesn't prove itself," she said. "A lot of people think we don't send innocent people to death row anymore, and that's just not the case."
Read the full article.
More on Aguirre's case.
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"A Few Thoughts on Maryland v. King"
From Orin Kerr at The Volokh Conspiracy. In part: For the majority, per Justice Kennedy, taking and analyzing DNA samples upon arrest is okay because taking DNA is generally about identifying the person under arrest, which is a very important...
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Hundreds of Drivers Arrested for DUI over Memorial Day Weekend
During major holiday weekends, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department increases its efforts to crack down on drunk driving. The Daily Breeze reports that 529 people were arrested in Los Angeles County over the Memorial Day weekend this year. Furthermore, 35 DUI arrests were made in Orange County. Throughout California, 1,133 people were arrested for driving under the influence and 15 DUI-related fatalities were reported over the holiday weekend.
The Los Angeles County arrests were made as part of the "Avoid the 100 Los Angeles County DUI Campaign." Funding for the campaign comes from the California Office of Traffic Safety through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). This campaign involves a DUI task force that utilizes sobriety checkpoints and DUI saturation patrols throughout the county.
The DUI task force uses the patrols and checkpoints to arrest impaired drivers in a highly visible manner to deter drunk driving. According to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the task force will be out in full force this coming July 4 as well as the Labor Day holiday weekend.
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Does this count as a 'drone'? If cell-phone towers can fly, why not a 'Stingray'?
Via Ars TechnicaDoes a flying cell-phone tower count as a drone? You decide. The bill Texas just passed that's awaiting a decision by Gov. Perry would regulate "unmanned aircraft." And under that statute, "In this chapter, 'image' means any capturing of sound waves, thermal, infrared, ultraviolet, visible light, or other electromagnetic waves, odor, or other conditions existing on or about real property in this state or an individual located on that property." So arguably this use would be illegal under Texas' bill. Should it be? Grits is not so sure. I'm less concerned with cell-phone companies using drones this way than, say, if law enforcement were to install a Stingray device on an unmanned aircraft. The latter should be outright banned. The former may be perfectly appropriate in a regulated environment and could be a tremendous boon to rural areas with poor cell-phone coverage.Grits believes there are a vast number of potential uses for "drones," far more than most people, and certainly most Texas legislators, have properly considered. Its principle saving grace is that, even if Gov. Perry signs it into law, it'll be a couple of years before the Federal Aviation Administration allow civilian drones in commercial airspace. So Texas will get another chance to get it right in 2015.Related:National expert laments Texas' drone billTop Five Things Wrong With Texas' Drone BillA path forward for state drone regulation
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