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CANADA - Preying on predators: Anonymous group has noble intentions but risky tactics, police say

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Anonymous Criminals Original Article 06/17/2013 By Jen Gerson The videos started to trickle in this month: the now-familiar Guy Fawkes mask, a computerized female voice, stock video graphics and bland instrumental background music. “Hello citizens of Edmonton Alberta Canada. We are Anonymous.” The loosely organized online activism group is at the forefront of modern cyber-dissent, protesting a range of organizations and people, ranging from Scientology to PlayStation and Sarah... [[ This is a content summary only. Visit my website for full links, other content, and more! ]]

The Zealous Prosecution of New York Gun and Firearm Cases: When an Injury may not be Caused by Criminal Conduct

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Everyone is scared of guns. After all, some horrific incidents have corroborated why many lawmakers in New York believe the strict firearm laws of the New York Penal Law are necessary. While there is little doubt that firearms in the wrong hands are overwhelmingly dangerous and laws must be enacted and enforced to protect the public and prevent the misuse of weapons, a blanket fear of firearms does not necessitate over zealous prosecutions. Just as the owner of a lawfully registered out of state firearm can be charged with a felony for attempting to legally check his weapon at a NYC airport (JFK Airport, for example), other individuals may be charged with weapon crimes that really are not consistent with the hyper-technical conduct of the accused. In People v. Evans, 2013 NY Slip Op 1950 - NY: Appellate Div., 4th Dept. 2013, a judge convicted the defendant for Assault in the Second Degree where the crime was based in the reckless possession of a weapon. There, the gun in question was a saw offed shotgun that accidentally misfired and struck another person. Pursuant to New York Penal Law 120.05(4), it is punishable by as much as a seven years in prison if you "recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument." The question before the Appellate Court was not whether the possession of the weapon in and of itself was illegal, but whether or not it was used in a reckless manner resulting in the serious physical injury. The theory supported by the prosecution was that the defendant was reckless because he brought a loaded gun to a public park, he possessed it near others, pointed it at the complainant, had been drinking alcohol and ignored the risk of a misfire. Certainly, if true, all of these factors could potentially support the elements or reckless conduct. Equally important, if true, this defendant needed a swift kick in his ass (whether from his friends, parents, spouse or even his criminal attorney). Fortunately for the defendant, however, as ugly and bad as the allegations appeared to be, the People never met their legal burden. Whether it was the fact that a firearm was involved in a shooting (an accidental one) or that the ultimate injury was serious, the charge did not fit the crime. Yes, weapons of any kind can alter - and end - one's life, but potential to cause great harm does not equate to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In ultimately reversing the conviction for Second Degree Assault and dismissing the indictment, the Appeals Court noted that despite the People's claims the evidence did not support the theory that the defendant brought the weapon to the park, pointed the firearm at another individual, knew the shotgun was loaded and disregarded the danger of the firearm discharging as he drank alcohol. In fact, according to the only witness who observed the incident, the firearm discharged as soon as the weapon was picked up. There is nothing overwhelmingly valuable about this legal decision in terms of the law (well, it certainly does assist in ascertaining when one's conduct becomes reckless in the eyes of the New York Penal Law), but there is a more practical value. First, once a firearm is involved in any case, law enforcement seems to take a heightened approach in the investigation and prosecution. Consider this your notice. While this attitude may be warranted when the firearm is illegally owned in any jurisdiction, defaced or used in an obvious criminal manner, mere involvement of a firearm in an alleged crime should not mean that the accused is guilty of criminal conduct. Second, there is no doubt that staying away from knives, blades, guns and explosives minimizes one's risk to injury and exposure to prosecution (didn't mom teach us that?). Arguably, unless you are trained and experienced with these things, you steer clear. Otherwise, at some point you may be making an emergency phone call to a physician or criminal defense attorney. To learn more about the various degrees of both misdemeanor and felony Assault in New York or New York weapon crimes, follow the highlighted links. A New York criminal defense firm, Crotty Saland PC's criminal lawyers represent clients throughout New York City. Before starting the criminal defense practice, the two founding attorneys served as prosecutors in the Manhattan District Attorney's Office.

Colonizing Humanity

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Samera Esmeir, Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History (Stanford University Press, 2012).Kunal ParkerSamera Esmeir’s ambitious book, Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History, explores the legal transformation of British-ruled Egypt between the 1880s and the 1930s. With news from Egypt the subject of daily headlines, the book is timely and important. However, it is Esmeir’s innovative treatment of her subject that truly makes this book deserving of the widest readership. In contradistinction to a powerful tradition of writing about colonialism, Esmeir sees in [...]

Third, Fourth, Whatever

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<font style="FONT-SIZE: 12px" face="Arial">Fascination spread across the blawgosphere as something that almost never happens happened in Henderson, Nevada.<a href= "http://randazza.wordpress.com/2013/07/04/third-amendment-case-in-nevada/" target="">Marc Randazza</a> first pointed to the story from <a href= "https://www.courthousenews.com/2013/07/03/59061.htm" target="">Courthouse News</a>:</font> <blockquote><font style="FONT-SIZE: 12px" face="Arial">The Mitchell family’s claim includes Third Amendment violations, a rare claim in the United States....<br> <br> The complaint continues: “Defendant Officer David Cawthorn outlined the defendants’ plan in his official report: ‘It was determined to move to 367 ...</font></blockquote>

TN: Good faith exception statute not retroactive -- it's ex post facto

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Defendant was indicted for a marijuana grow operation in 2005. The search was not suppress for a warrant time error, but it was reversed on appeal in 2009 because Tennessee finds that not a mere technical violation. In 2011 the legislature adopted “Exclusionary Rule Reform Act” to adopt the good faith exception, and defendant was reindicted. The state argued the statute was retroactive and validated the 2005 search, and the trial court did not agree. The state appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals found the statute not retroactive. State v. Hayes, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 576 (July 1, 2013): [...] Read more!

CA10: Grabbing waistband in high crime area important on reasonable suspicion

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High-crime area, change of direction and increased pace, grabbing at waistline, two men splitting paths, defendant’s backpedaling when talked to, flight of his companion. The district court didn’t put much weight in the grabbing at waistline, but this court does [as do almost every other court]. United States v. Briggs, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13488 (10th Cir. July 2, 2013).* Carrying two plastic bags to one’s car at night in a high crime area simply doesn’t add up to reasonable suspicion. Motion to suppress granted. United States v. Lunas, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93207 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013).* It was objectively reasonable for the officer to have concluded defendant’s seatbelt was not fastened, and that justified the stop. United States v. Hughes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93643 (W.D. N.C. July 3, 2013).*

N.D.Okla.: "investigative detention of defendant and the sweep of his home turned into a lengthy and warrantless occupation of defendant's house"

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Officers had a 911 call that there was a domestic disturbance, and, at the scene, defendant came out of the house to talk with them and was calm and cooperative. Still, they had exigent circumstances for an emergency entry to check for injured persons. The “investigative detention of defendant and the sweep of his home turned into a lengthy and warrantless occupation of defendant's house.” Consent finally granted was tainted. United States v. Warthen, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93274 (N.D. Okla. July 3, 2013): [...] Read more!

Wiretaps, Real Estate and the Police Databases

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This post examines a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in a civil case:  Seitz v. City of Elgin, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 3176502 (2013). Debra Seitz and Greg Welter (Plaintiffs) sued the City of Elgin and others, claiming the defendants violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S. Code § 2510 et seq.  Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  (More on who was sued and for what in a moment.)As Wikipedia notes, the Electronic Communications PrivacyAct of 1986 [ECPA], (codified at 18 U.S. Code §§ 2510–2522) was enacted by the United States Congress to extend government restrictions on wire taps from telephone calls to include transmissions of electronic data by computer. Specifically, ECPA was an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the Wiretap Statute), which was primarily designed to prevent unauthorized government access to private electronic communications.The ECPA also added new provisions prohibiting access to stored electronic communications, i.e., the Stored Communications Act,18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12. We will come back to ECPA.  First, the facts.  The opinion says that when the events that gave rise to this suit arose, Seitz was “a real estate professional” and Welter was “an Elgin police officer.” Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra. It also says thatDebra Seitz and Greg Welter are partners who own in part Wasco Investment Corp., a property management company.Although the partnership totals six, Seitz and Greg run the company's day-to-day operations. . . . To facilitate Wasco's operations, both Seitz and Greg created Yahoo! email accounts.In August 2010, a City employee approached Seitz with copies of emails that she [the employee] and Greg had exchanged using the email accounts. The emails showed that Greg had used the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (`LEADS’) to research cars parked in front of Wasco properties. Illinois . . . limits use of LEADS to criminal justice purposes. See Illinois Admininstrative Code tit. 20, § 1240.80(a), (d).  A few days later, Elgin's police chief confronted Greg with the emails and notified him of a coming misconduct investigation regarding his use of LEADS. The City officials had obtained the emails through an anonymous letter sent to Elgin's corporation counsel. Tamara, a fellow Elgin police officer, and Robert Beeter were allegedly behind that letter. They accessed Greg's email account, read through emails stored on that account, printed the emails at the heart of this litigation, and conveyed those print-outs to the corporation counsel under cover of anonymity.Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  At the time, Tamara was Greg’s wife.  Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  According to this news story, [s]omeone -- who the plaintiffs believe to be Beeter or Tamara Welter -- anonymously mailed printouts of some of the emails to a city official. As a result, the lawsuit says, in August 2010 Police Chief Jeff Swoboda showed Greg Welter the printouts and warned the lieutenant he was going to be investigated for alleged misconduct. A few days later, Greg Welter resigned from the police force.The lawsuit claims that by using emails that were illegally obtained, Swoboda, City Corporation Counsel Bill Cogley and Elgin Professional Standards Officer James Barnes violated Greg Welter’s and Seitz’s right to privacy and became accessories to the breaking of federal wiretapping laws. The suit asks that the city pay Greg Welter and Seitz an unspecified amount in damages, and that city officials erase and keep secret all information in the emails.You can read more about the facts in this other news story. Since it says the email account was “hacked,” I assume Tamara and Robert did not have Greg’s permission to access it. And, finally, this news story from last Mayreported that Beeter was arrested after being charged with “identity theft” and “misconduct”, apparently in connection with the conduct at issue in this case. The City of Elgin (“City”) responded by filing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the claim against it on several grounds, one of which was that “the Federal Wiretap Act (FWA)” does not create “a cause of action against municipalities.  Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  As Wikipedia notes, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is how lawsuits with insufficient legal theories underlying their cause of action are dismissed from court. For example, assault requires intent, so if the plaintiff has failed to plead intent, the defense can seek dismissal by filing a 12(b)(6) motion. When a defendant files such a motion, the issue for the court to decide is whether the plaintiff’s claim is legally viable.  The motion does not require the court to decide what facts are true and what are not; that will be for the jury if and when the case goes to trial. The district court judge who had the case granted the motion because he found that Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F.3d 976 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 2000), controlled: because the FWA prohibited `persons’ from intercepting communications and did not extend its definition of `person’  to municipalities, the FWA authorized no cause of action against municipalities.  Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, supra.  Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.The Court of Appeals then turned to the City’s argument, noting that the FWA confers acivil cause of action on `any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter.’ 18 U.S. Code § 2520(a).  The aggrieved party may sue `the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation.’ Id. The statute did not always read this way, however. Initially, it authorized recovery only against `the person who violated the FWA.  Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, supra. In 1986, . . . Congress extended the cause of action from against any `person’ to against any `person or entity’ who committed the violation. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, § 103, 100 Stat. 1848. . . . Finally, in 2001, the PATRIOT Act amended the statute again, yielding the current wording that extends liability to a `person or entity, other than the United States.’ USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107–56, § 223(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 293.Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  As to whether the City of Elgin could be a person, the Court of Appeals explained that the FWA also defines `person.’ A person is `any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation. 18 U.S. Code § 2510(6). The plain text of that definition -- which has remained unchanged since passage of the original act in 1968 --does not extend to government units. Instead, it reaches only employees or agents of a government. The Senate Report accompanying the original bill confirmed this meaning: `The definition explicitly includes any officer or employee of the United States or any State or political subdivision of a State. . . . Only the governmental units themselves are excluded. . . . Otherwise the definition is intended to be comprehensive.’  Amati v. City of Woodstock, Ill., 829 F. Supp. 998 (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 1993) (quoting Senate Report No. 90–1097 (1968). . . . Thus, as originally composed in 1968, the FWA created a cause of action only against `persons’ and then excluded municipalities from the definition of `persons.’ It created no cause of action against municipalities or any other governmental unit. Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  The plaintiffs argued, however, that Congress’ including the word “entity” in the 1986amendments brought municipalities within the scope of § 2520.  Because the definition of `person’ already included `partnership[s], association[s], joint stock compan[ies], trust[s], or corporation[s],’ they advance, the word `entity’ must reach government units. Plaintiffs are right: The plain meaning of `entity’ includes government units. Black's Law Dictionary 477 (5th ed. 1979) (`Entity includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit.’).  And if `entity’ referred only to business or nonprofit corporations and associations, the 1986 amendments would add nothing to the statute because the definition of `person’ already included such organizations. We must give effect to each word when interpreting statutes, . . . and defining `entity’ to reach only organizations already defined as `persons’ would render `entity’ superfluous. The subsequent amendment of § 2520 by the PATRIOT Act -- to add the phrase `other than the United States’ as a modifier to `person or entity’ -- only underscores that something in the phrase `person or entity’ encompasses government units. If not, then no need existed for the PATRIOT Act's qualifier.Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  The Court of Appeals agree with the Plaintiffs that “entity” as used in 18 U.S. Code § 2520 “includes government units,” but found that the Plaintiffs “nevertheless have no cause of action against the City for the specific FWA violations alleged here.” Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra. It noted that § 2520 itself creates no substantive rights. Rather, it simply provides a cause of action to vindicate rights identified in other portions of the FWA, specifically communications `intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter.’ § 2520(a) (emphasis added). . . . Thus, we must look to the scope and nature of the specific substantive right plaintiffs accuse defendants of violating to determine whether plaintiffs may assert that right against a municipality. Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  The court explained that these Plaintiffs accused the City of Elgin of violating [18 U.S. Code] § 2511(1)(c)-(d), which prohibits `any person’ from intentionally disclosing or using communications intercepted in violation of the FWA. . . . Thus, § 2511(1) protects only against actions taken by a `person as defined in the statute, which does not include municipalities. See 18 U.S. Code § 2510(6) Only a `person’ can violate § 2511(1). And because § 2520 creates a cause of action only for `violation[s] of’ the FWA, it necessarily follows that § 2520 confers a cause of action to enforce § 2511(1) only against persons as defined by the statute. We therefore reaffirm the conclusion of Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, supra, even though `entity’ includes government units, § 2520 provides no cause of action against a municipality for violations of § 2511(1) because nothing in the 1986 amendments altered the scope of the substantive violation by expanding it beyond `persons’ as defined in the FWA. Plaintiff's suggestion that the PATRIOT Act created such a cause fails for the same reason: Like the 1986 amendments, the PATRIOT Act amendments made no change to the scope of § 2511(1). That provision continues to apply only to a `person.’Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by explaining that[t]o sum up, the 1986 amendment permits suit against governmental units through the addition of `entity’ to the statutory text. But it does so only for substantive provisions that identify an `entity’ as a potential violator of that provision. Any conclusion otherwise ignores at least some part of the statutory text. If `entity’ does not extend to government units, it adds nothing to the statute. And if we subject governmental units to suit for violations of § 2511(1), we ignore the statute's use of `person’ rather than `person or entity.’ Our interpretation avoids both of these pitfalls, giving due weight to the addition of `entity’ while remaining faithful to the plain text of § 2511(1).Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra.  It therefore affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit.  Seitz v. City of Elgin, supra. 

D.Nev.: School officials accessing plaintiff's Twitter postings didn't violate the First or Fourth Amendments

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School officials accessing plaintiff's Twitter postings didn't violate the First or Fourth Amendments. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Twitter postings. Roasio v. Clark County School District, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93963 (D. Nev. July 3, 2013): [...] Read more!

Texting while judging: Judge texted assistance to prosecutors during trial(s)

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The Houston Chronicle today published an update ("Ex-prosecutor admits helping judge accused of sending secret text messages") on an ugly case of alleged judicial and prosecutorial misconduct out of Polk County. The article opened thusly:A former prosecutor has confessed to assisting a state district judge who is accused of texting clandestine messages from the bench to bolster the prosecution's case during an East Texas criminal trial last year.Such communication by Polk County Judge Elizabeth Coker was a violation of judicial impartiality that's required during court proceedings, said the former Polk County Assistant District Attorney Kaycee Jones. Jones has since been elected as a state district judge for Polk, Trinity and San Jacinto counties.Her confession and a photo copy of Coker's text message - detailing a line of witness questioning that would aid prosecutors - were outlined in a letter Jones sent to the Texas Bar Association's disciplinary counsel, which is investigating the incident. The Houston Chronicle, which first reported the allegations against Coker earlier this year, recently obtained a copy of the letter.For her part, Jones wrote, "I deeply regret that I acted in this manner. It was wrong and I knew better." An official in Jones' office said she could not comment on a pending investigation.So not only is the judge who texted advice to prosecutors is still on the bench, the assistant prosecutor accused of passing on her texts has herself been elected state district judge! What an embarrassment. Further evidence that the mechanisms for holding prosecutors and judges accountable for misconduct in Texas simply aren't effective or functional.A report by a court observer from the DA's office found that this was "not the first time" the judge had provided such ex parte assistance and the lead prosecutor said her second chair was "in her ear all the time regarding information she believes to be given her by Judge Coker via text during trial," not just in this case but in others. Further, "Besides complaints about Coker coaching prosecutors by dictating questions, complaints have been filed against her alleging discrimination in picking attorneys to handle indigent cases."As Mark Bennett pointed out, the surprise here isn't that a prosecution-oriented judge coached the state's attorney ex parte but that she did so in a form that could be documented and traced instead of face to face. Pretty darn brazen.

Kein Täter werden

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Im April 2012 nahm ein Präventionsprojekt gegen sexuellen Kindesmissbrauch seine Arbeit an einem Hamburger Standort auf: Als Teil des Netzwerkes „Kein Täter werden“ bietet seitdem das Universitätsklinikum Eppendorf (UKE) in einer Ambulanz in Altona betroffenen Männern mit pädophilen Neigungen kostenlos sexualtherapeutische Hilfe an. Ärztliche Schweigepflicht ist garantiert. Das Ziel des Hilfsangebots: Sexuelle Übergriffe auf Kinder zu verhindern. Kein Täter werden, Prävention von sexuellem Missbrauch in Hamburg, Hannover, Kiel, Berlin, Stralsund, Regensburg, Leipzig Foto: Plakatmotiv zur Medienkampagne Präventionsprojekt Dunkelfeld „Kein Täter werden“ Das Angebot richtet sich an alle Männer, die befürchten, einen sexuellen Übergriff zu begehen oder Darstellungen von Missbrauch zu nutzen, zum Beispiel im Internet. Allerdings dürfen sie (noch) nicht im Visier der Justiz sein, etwa wegen eines Verfahrens oder in Form von Auflagen. Bereits seit 2005 existiert das Projekt in Berlin. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine umfassende und längerfristige Therapie das Bewusstsein der Männer deutlich beeinflussen und damit die Risikofaktoren für einen sexuellen Übergriff reduzieren kann.Kein Täter werden, Prävention von sexuellem Missbrauch in Hamburg, Hannover, Kiel, Berlin, Stralsund, Regensburg, LeipzigDie Behörde für Justiz und Gleichstellung in Hamburg hat nun die Finanzierung für ein weiteres Jahr übernommen und sichert darüber hinaus eine langfristige Finanzierung zu. Das Forschungs- und Präventionsprojekt ist Teil eines bundesweiten Netzwerks mit weiteren Standorten in Berlin, Hannover, Kiel, Stralsund, Leipzig und Regensburg. In Hamburg haben sich im letzten Jahr mehr als 100 Männer mit pädophilen Neigungen oder deren Angehörige in der Ambulanz gemeldet. Nach einer ausführlicher Beratung sind bereits mehr als 40 Betroffene in regelmäßiger Therapie. Menschen mit sexuellem Interesse an Kindern oder Jugendlichen begehen nicht zwangsläufig sexuelle Übergriffe oder nutzen entsprechende Abbildungen, die einen sexuellen Missbrauch darstellen (sog. Kinderpornografie). Laut der polizeilichen Kriminalstatistik wurden 2012 in Hamburg 189 Fälle von sexuellem Kindesmissbrauch registriert und 22 Fälle von versuchtem Missbrauch. Mit jedem Mann, der das kostenlose Beratungs- und Therapieangebot annimmt, sinkt die Gefahr einer Straftat. Niemand ist Schuld an seiner sexuellen Neigung, aber jeder verantwortlich für sein Verhalten.

Government to Judge: It Sucks To Be The Defense

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<font style="FONT-SIZE: 12px" face="Arial">It's not yet known whether there was a smoking gun in the jury room, but whatever is known, it's not by the United States Attorney's office in the District of Vermont. And it just killing them. Bummer.<br> <br> From&nbsp;<a href="http://www.timesargus.com/article/20130703/NEWS03/707039909" target="">The Barre Montpelier Times Argus</a> (that's a name, right?):<br> <br></font> <blockquote><font style="FONT-SIZE: 12px" face="Arial">Prosecutors are asking a federal judge to order the turnover of defense interviews with jurors who sat on the death penalty case ...</font></blockquote>

Police Departments Lack Money for Training

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Budget cuts across the State of Florida have limited local police department's ability to properly train its officers. Money for training partially comes from a law enforcement training trust fund. The fund itself is at a all-time low. While the...

Updates: Mangum, Academic Freedom

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A couple of minor updates.First, Crystal Mangum’s long-delayed murder trial—the false accuser has gone through several attorneys, slowing down the process—is now scheduled, for mid-December. Mangum, who is supposedly financially destitute, posted bond several months ago, and is currently free awaiting the proceedings.Here’s how the Herald-Sun describedMangum’s infamy: “Mangum became nationally known in 2006 after she accused some Duke lacrosse players of sexually assaulting her after they hired her as a stripper for their party. Those charges were later dropped.”No mention of the charges being “false.” No mention that the state’s attorney general declared the players “innocent”—not merely that the charges were “dropped.” And a bizarre description of Reade Seligmann’s and Collin Finnerty’s role in the case, given that the quoted sentence—literally interpreted—suggests that “they” hired Mangum for “their” party, even though neither of them played any role in the organization of the party.Such slanting in hard-news items has become increasingly common in the H-S since Bob Ashley’s return as editor. It’s almost as if Ashley wants to subtly shade post-case news coverage to make up for the discredited manner in which his newspaper covered the case itself.Along those lines: the H-Sapplied its normal biases in covering Duke’s unsuccessful efforts to force me to turn over confidential, unpublished exchanges with sources for the book and the blog. The paper sympathetically portrayed Duke’s legal filings, triumphantly reported on Duke’s short-term victory before the magistrate judge in Maine, and mentioned my appeal. And then the paper suddenly lost interest—no analysis of major Maine newspapers and TV stations filing an amicus brief portraying one of the nation’s major research universities as hostile to the First Amendment; no coverage of the hearing before Judge Brock Hornby in which Duke’s high-priced attorneys found themselves immediately on the defensive, and in which they made extraordinary claims about the future standards to which Duke’s own professors should be held; no discussion of the collapse of Duke’s efforts and the ultimate vacating of the magistrate judge’s order. As far as readers of the H-S know, Duke now has access to my e-mail files.The transcript of the January hearing is now publicly available, and I thought it might be worth highlighting two exchanges that the H-S did not deem newsworthy—since Duke’s attorneys, speaking (they said) for the university, articulated an approach to academic freedom that I’m not sure any other research university in the country holds.The first exchange occurred less than a minute into Duke’s oral argument:THE COURT: Well, I do have two questions. One is this, and this may be a rhetorical question, but Duke University obviously has a lot of researchers and academics of its own who write books, and whatever you’re seeking here may come back to affect Duke. So I take it this is the institutional posture of Duke University in terms of the academic freedom interests of its researchers and faculty members; is that right?MR. SEGARS: Your Honor, I think Duke University would be happy with the rule that it’s asking this Court to impose on the facts of this case.I expect that the next time a Duke faculty member receives a third-party subpoena demanding that he or she be deposed and turn over confidential, unpublished correspondence with sources, this exchange will be cited.The second exchange came near the end of the proceedings, after Duke’s attorneys attempted to mischaracterize my arguments:THE COURT: I understand the argument [presented by my attorney, Patrick Strawbridge] to be slightly different than that. I don’t think there’s any claim that the plaintiffs cannot waive their own rights or should not perhaps expect that they can be explored, but what does this do to future academic researchers, and future journalists as they decide to publish a book or decide to write something else? Do they know they’re thereby opening themselves to considerable expense and time involvement in responding to lawsuit discovery?MR. SEGARS: That’s a good question, Your Honor. I think that the rule we’re seeking would tell those researchers academicians, journalists that, A, I need to be clear about the confidentiality I promised to my sources, and B, if I’m ever subpoenaed I need to make a record of that confidentiality with respect to the communications that I’m intending to withhold.THE COURT: But it also says if I write a book I’d better expect to spend a lot of time dealing with lawyers in terms of producing all of the research work that I did and distract me from the next book I want to write because I’m responding to what lawyers want for an earlier lawsuit, right?MR. SEGARS: That’s a fair question, Your Honor. On the facts of this case where the subpoenaing party has literally gone out and deposed 41 plaintiffs, we’ve subpoenaed the attorneys, we’ve tried to get what we could, and I hear what Mr. Strawbridge says, that I am unable to point to a particular document that Dr. Johnson has that I don’t.To reiterate: Duke’s attorneys said they’re entirely comfortable with this standard being applied to Duke faculty in future cases. I wonder how many Duke professors are actually aware of the new academic freedom rules under which their institution operates.

Binay bill seeks to ban sex offenders from staying near schools

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7-5-2013 Philippines: MANILA, Philippines—A bill that would prohibit sex offenders from entering, loitering or gaining access to schools and residing 300 meters from the premises has been filed... [[This,an article summary.Please visit my website for complete article, and more.]]

The Third Amendment and criminal investigation

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Ilya Somin at The Volokh Conspiracy has this interesting post, excerpting an article discussing the case: Henderson [Nevada] police arrested a family for refusing to let officers use their homes as lookouts for a domestic violence investigation of their neighbors,...

Escaped Montana inmate shot and killed by deputy sheriff

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7-6-2013 Montana: A convicted sex offender who escaped from a Montana prison was shot and killed on Friday by a deputy sheriff at a shopping center in Billings, police said. Dean Jess, 42, was... [[This,an article summary.Please visit my website for complete article, and more.]]

AUSTRALIA - False abuse claims are the new court weapon, retiring judge says

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Justice David Collier Original Article 07/06/2013 By Harriet Alexander Allegations of child sexual abuse are being increasingly invented by mothers to stop fathers from seeing their children, says a retiring Family Court judge. Justice David Collier, retiring from Parramatta Family Court at the end of the month after 14 years on the bench, sees unprecedented hostility infiltrating the Family Court, and a willingness by parents to use their children to damage one another. "If a... [[ This is a content summary only. Visit my website for full links, other content, and more! ]]

Five Montana Indian reservations do not report DUI convictions to the State

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Indian reservations enjoy some autonomy from the state in which they are located. They have their own judicial system. However, one of the legal obligations with which they are supposed to comply is in the enforcement of Driving Under the Influence (DUI) laws, as well as reporting convictions that result. Five reservations in Montana have not been reporting DUI convictions that occur on their lands. Many states, including Illinois, base criminal sentences upon a driver's record. In Illinois, a driver who has never been convicted of DUI is eligible for court supervision. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1 However, any prior supervision, a prior DUI conviction, including an out of state offense, any reckless driving conviction that was the result of a plea bargain, and any statutory summary or implied consent suspension, unless the driver took a breath test and registered .08 or higher and was found not guilty of the DUI, would disqualify the driver from being eligible for supervision. It stands to reason that if a DUI conviction is not reported to the state, someone who was not legally eligible for supervision due to a prior conviction could still receive it. Supervision is important for two reasons. First, a supervision disposition cannot include jail time. Second, supervision is not a conviction for purposes of base driving privileges (the rules are different for CDL holders). While a conviction results in an automatic revocation of driving privileges and the need for a formal hearing with the Illinois Secretary of State (625 ILCS 5/6-205), supervision avoids a conviction. The number of DUI convictions and summary suspensions is critical in other areas of Illinois DUI law. At the time of a DUI arrest, the driver will be asked to submit to chemical testing, either breath or blood, to determine the blood alcohol level (BAL).

Injury crash SH8 milepost 52 Elk River

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IDAHO STATE POLICE NEWS RELEASE - generated by our News Release ListServer DO NOT REPLY --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Idaho State Police Regional Communication Center - North 615 W Wilbur Ave Suite A Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 Please direct questions to the appropriate District Offices District 1 (208) 209-8620 Fax (208) 209- 8618 District 2 (208) 799-5150 CASE # L130000521 --------------------- PRESS RELEASE ----------------------------- DATE: 7/5/13 TIME: 5:12 PM Time. LOCATION: SH8 MP 52 Elk River ASSISTING AGENCIES: Clearwater County Sheriff VEHICLE #1 ------------- DRIVER Ricky Bidlake AGE 58 ADDRESS Potlatch, ID INJURIES? - Yes HOSPITAL/LOCATION TAKEN ? St Joseph Hospital Lewiston VEHICLE YEAR 2007 VEHICLE MAKE United Motors VEHICLE MODEL motorcycle WRECKER N/A SEATBELTS/HELMET WORN? No INCIDENT NARRATIVE: Bidlake was eastbound on SH8 at milepost 52 near Elk River. He entered a curve and lost control. He laid the motorcycle on its side off the road. He was life flighted to St Joseph's Hospital in Lewiston. DSP INITIALS bb -----------------------------------
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