According to an article in the MetroWest Daily News, a Sudbury family reported that approximately $15,000 worth of jewelry and silver was missing from their home in October. The wife described the missing items to the police, which included white gold and diamond earrings, a gold necklace, a silver cup and four Tiffany & Company silver spoons. The wife also told police that the stolen items had been stored in cases at the home and that the cases had been left, empty but in their original location, at the house.
During the course of the investigation, it came to light that the family had hired a nanny - Sarah Anne Hampton - in September. Hampton worked for the family for approximately five weeks and then quit, telling the family that she needed to leave for medical reasons. Hampton was subsequently questioned by police about the stolen items. She told officers that she had left the job because she was addicted to heroin, and denied having any role in the thefts.
The police then conducted further investigation and found several of the stolen items at pawn shops in Worcester under a man's name. Police questioned the man, who told them that Hampton had purportedly come to him asking for help getting heroin, that the two of them went to Worcester together, and that the man pawned the items and gave Hampton the cash so that she could buy heroin. According to the article, the man claimed he thought she got the items from an uncle. Police ultimately determined that Hampton and the man pawned items on six different occasions, getting about $3,000 for the goods. After the police spoke with the man, who was not arrested, they arrested Hampton and charged her with a variety of theft offenses, including six counts each of larceny from a building, larceny of property worth more than and conspiracy to commit a crime. She also was charged with intimidation of a witness.
Sudbury Nanny Allegedly Stole Silver From Employers
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AQAP Sweats the Small Stuff
According to Associated Press reporter Rukmini Callimachi in Mali, it appears al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is very focused on accounting.
The convoy of cars bearing the black al Qaeda flag came at high speed, and the manager of the...
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"Church Official’s Conviction Revoked in Abuse Case"
From The New York Times: The reversal of Monsignor Lynn’s conviction turned on disputed interpretations of Pennsylvania’s former child welfare law and does not have legal implications for other states. Prosecution of supervising officials for their handling of priests accused...
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SD: Stop and frisk of innocent man was still with RS and search was reasonable
Defendant was mistaken for being a casino robber who had entered a Sioux Falls casino at night wearing sunglasses and a baseball cap pulled way down over his eyes. A casino employee had seen a poster with the robber’s photograph, and she thought he was the man. She hit the “panic button” that called the police, and, when on the phone, was acting really scared and afraid to talk. “The overall tone and nature of the call—an identified, concerned citizen feeling so threatened that she is unable to speak openly with a dispatcher—further supports the officers' reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” When the police arrived, they went over to defendant and talked to him. When he tensed up, they frisked him finding a meth pipe. The frisk was still with reasonable suspicion, although he was the wrong man. The casino employee was not a CI because she talked with the police and was identifiable. State v. Mohr, 2013 SD 94, 2013 S.D. LEXIS 154 (December 18, 2013).
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OH5: ‘Blading’ one's body alone is not enough for RS
“[V]irtually the only suspicious activity the officer articulated was ‘blading’ his body away from the officer's view. We find this testimony insufficient to conclude the stop of appellant was proper.” State v. Caplinger, 2013-Ohio-5675, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5940 (5th Dist. December 10, 2013).*
Pre-Jones GPS tracking will not be excluded under Davis. Indeed, in this case, the defense at first conceded it was valid under circuit precedent and didn’t pursue the argument until Jones came down. United States v. Smith, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25555 (11th Cir. December 23, 2013).
Probable cause for the search warrant of defendant’s property was shown based on the product of wiretaps and then three CIs who were corroborated. United States v. Boon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179674 (W.D. N.Y. December 12, 2013).*
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OH7: Search of wallet during a frisk for weapons unreasonable
Defendant was fidgety and he was removed from the car and frisked. His wallet was removed. He was allowed back in the car but was still fidgety [there was stuff in the backseat that would have made it uncomfortable]. He consented to a second frisk. Yet, no weapon was ever found. The officer finally searched his wallet admitting that he was unconcerned about a weapon. The search of the wallet was unreasonable. State v. Dunlap, 2013-Ohio-5637, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5898 (7th Dist. December 17, 2013).
Defense counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress alleging third-party consent was coerced when defense counsel was never informed of any facts by the defendant to support that argument. The police reports said it was by consent, and the defendant and his witnesses didn’t contradict it. Kinsella v. State, 2013 ND 238, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 249 (December 19, 2013). [Note: Doesn't this beg the question of defense counsel's duty to inquire into whether the police reports were correct? After all, the writer of the police report isn't about to put in there that he "let me search, but I might have coerced consent." When debriefing the client, it is defense counsel's duty to at least ask about the voluntariness of consent and statements and the legality of searches.]
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GA - Georgia Vigilantes Beat Up Potential Sex Predator At Their House
Original Article
View the video here
12/26/2013
By Jonathan Wolfe
A group of young Georgia men are attracting some attention after posting a video of themselves beating up a potential sexual predator. The video, titled “To Catch a Predator with VillainPros” was posted yesterday and has been viewed over 13,000 times as of this writing.
The video starts with a message from the self-described VillainPros.
- Visit their website, Facebook, YouTube channel. The white male is apparently Michael...
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Freispruch nach Verwechslung
Ein Franzose soll vor rund fünf Jahren in Weil am Rhein einer damals 44-jährige Frau nackt in der Damendusche aufgelauert und versucht haben, sie zu berühren. Wegen des Vorwurfs der versuchten sexuellen Nötigung (§ 177 StGB) wurde der Fall vor dem Schöffengericht angeklagte. Direkt nach dem Vorfall wurde der Angeklagte vom Saunameister festgehalten. Der . . . → Read More: Freispruch nach VerwechslungÄhnliche Beiträge:Mögliche Vergewaltigung nicht nachweisbar –…Freispruch nach angeblicher VergewaltigungFreispruch nach tödlichem Sex-UnfallFreispruch nach NotwehrFreispruch nach vermeintlichem Raub
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ND: Jardines and the drug sniffing dog at the door of a house does not apply to an apartment building
Jardines and the drug sniffing dog at the door of a house does not apply to an apartment building because apartments don’t have curtilage. State v. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 258 (December 26, 2013):
=> Read more!
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SFGate: Attorney General: Marijuana Legalization Would Save Calif. "Hundreds of Millions"
SFGate: Attorney General: Marijuana Legalization Would Save Calif. "Hundreds of Millions" by Chris Roberts:
=> Read more!
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Oklahoma Hands Down Some of the Longest Drug Sentences in the Nation
This summer, United States Attorney General Eric Holder decried “draconian” mandatory minimums for low-level drug offenders. He said that the federal government would no longer pursue minor drug offenders, leaving their prosecution up to the individual states. Instead, the feds would focus their efforts on prosecuting violent offenders and members of organized crimes, including gangs […]
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MintPressNews: A U.S. citizen has accused Customs and Border Patrol officers of sexual assault after she endured a six-hour anal and vaginal cavity search
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20 Driving Patterns That Can Get You Pulled Over for a DUI
The below list by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) is a compilation of the 20 most common driving patterns exhibited by drunk drivers. Next to each pattern is a numeric probability that the driver is under the influence. Note: When there are multiple patterns from one vehicle, the NHTSA adds 10% to [...](Visited 1 times, 1 visits today)
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The Cell Phone, Cellebrite and Search Incident to Arrest
--> After he was charged with violating 18 U.S. Code § 1951(a)(the Hobbs Act) and 18 U.S. Code § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), Woodrow Rudolph Dixon, Jr. filed a motion to suppress certain evidence, as I explain below. U.S. v. Dixon, 2013 WL 6055396 (U.S.District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 2013). Section 1951(a) makes it a federal crime to obstruct, delay or affect commerce by “robbery or extortion” or by committing or threatening physical violence against “any person or property”. Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i) makes it a federal crime to use or carry a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime”. The only information I can find about how the case arose is in this opinion, and all it says is at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, [Federal] Agent Spence Burnett testified that [Dixon] was arrested on an arrest warrant issued on the basis of a complaint charging him with conspiracy to rob an individual he believed was a drug trafficker and with possession of firearms in relation to the conspiracy. . . . Burnett confirmed [Dixon] was arrested as he exited a building and was handcuffed and secured at that time. . . . Burnett also testified that before the arrest he was aware of information indicating [Dixon] had used telephones in connection with the commission of the offense for which he was being arrested. U.S. v. Dixon, supra. Dixon moved to suppress “any evidence obtained from the search of his Samsung cell phone by an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,and Firearms (`BATF’) conducted after it was seized from him at the time of his arrest”. U.S. v. Dixon, supra. According to the opinion, this is how the search came about and what it involved: [T]he only phone at issue is the Samsung cell phone [Dixon] had open in his hand and was using when he was arrested. . . . [It] is a Samsung Galaxy `smart-phone’ with an Android operating system. . . . Agent Daniel Arrugueta with BATF testified that he was present when [Dixon] was arrested and that he was the agent who seized the phone. . . . [Dixon] had exited a nearby building and was starting to get into his car when he was arrested. . . . He was ordered to put his hands on the car. . . . The phone . . . was taken from him and put on top of the car. . . . Arrugueta seized the phone off of the car roof and took the phone back to his office. . . . Arrugueta testified that when he got back to his offices he extracted the data from [Dixon’s] cell phone, from the phone itself and from the micro `SD Card,’ a storage media in the phone. . . . He is trained in extracting evidence as a `Computer Examiner.’ . . . He used a device called `Cellebrite’ which plugs into the phone to extract data from the phone. . . . While he was performing his extractions, Arrugueta called Agent Spence to be sure the process of booking [Dixon], which was being done at a different location, was still ongoing so that his search would be `within the parameters of the incident to arrest.’ . . . He was advised [Dixon] was still being booked. . . . He burned CDs of the information he extracted from the phone. . . . Arrugueta had no concern that the device was dangerous. . . . But he also allowed as how there is always concern that data might disappear by virtue of a `remote wipe.’ . . . Therefore, the first thing Arrugueta would do would be to turn the phone off and take out the battery. . . . These actions eliminate the possibility that the phone could be wiped remotely. . . . Arrugueta did not do a `full dump’ on the phone because that process can take hours and likely would extend beyond arrest and booking. . . . He would usually get a warrant if a `full dump’ were needed. . . . But he did extract data from the SD card, a form of storage media, which took about thirty minutes. . . . Arrugueta considered the cell phone to be a `container’ that he could go through as long as it was done while the booking process was still ongoing. . . . U.S. v. Dixon, supra. The reference to the agent’s assuming the phone was a “container” indicates he thought it was an item he could search without obtaining a search warrant under the search incident exception to the 4th Amendment’s default requirement that officers have a warrant to search someone’s property. In his motion to suppress, Dixon argued that the warrantless search of his phone cannot be sustained in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.332 (2009). . . . He submits that neither officer security nor evidence preservation -- the dual justifications for searches incident to arrest -- apply to validate the search of Defendant's cell phone and the extraction of its data. . . . U.S. v. Dixon, supra. In U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the Supreme Court held that when an officer arrests someone, he can search the arrestee and anything he/she is carrying for either or both of two reasons: to disarm the suspect and/or to find and take possession of any evidence the person is carrying to prevent it from being destroyed. The prosecution argued, in response, that the search of the cell phone fell within the well-established exception to the warrant requirement permitting searches and seizures from persons incident to their arrest. . . . The government argues that this exception encompasses the right to search any closed containers, including a cell phone taken from the arrestee's person, and Arizona v. Gant does not limit this well-established exception. . . . The government alludes to the risk the phone could be remotely locked or its data remotely deleted, implicating the need to preserve evidence. . . . U.S. v. Dixon, supra. The judge began her analysis of the arguments by noting that the issue presented in is whether the search of [Dixon’s] cell phone . . . was authorized under . . . the `search incident to arrest’ exception to the warrant requirement. The government relies upon this `long-standing’ exception to the warrant requirement permitting not only the seizure of items from the arrestee's person but the search of any container, to include cigarette packs and cell phones, found on the arrestee as well, even when made after the actual arrest back at the agents' offices. The government cites U.S. v. Robinson, supra (upholding search of closed cigarette package on arrestee's person); U.S. v.Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (warrantless search and seizure of Defendant's clothing ten hours after arrest upheld where search of clothing could have been made `on the spot’); U.S. v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 2007) (upholding search of cell phone incident to arrest); and U.S. v. Flores–Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit 2012) (upholding search incident to arrest of cell phone for its phone number but questioning whether more invasive search would be permissible). U.S. v. Dixon, supra. As noted above, Dixon relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, supra, as having changed the calculus used to determine the applicability of this exception to seizure of cell phones. [He] also highlights recent authority in the wake of Gant that limits the warrantless search of cell phone data seized incident to arrest. See U.S. v. Wurie, 2013 WL 2129119 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit 2013) (`the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee's person, because the government has not convinced us such a search is ever necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence’); Smallwood v. State, 113 So.3d 724 (Florida Supreme Court 2013) (`while law enforcement officers properly separated and assumed possession of a cell phone from Smallwood's person during the search incident to arrest, a warrant was required before the information, data, and content of the cell phone could be accessed and searched by law enforcement.’). U.S. v. Dixon, supra. The judge then began her analysis of the issue, noting that if “if Robinson and its progeny were the governing authority applicable in this case, it would not be difficult to conclude that the search in this case should be sustained, so long as it was considered to be incident to [Dixon’s] arrest.” U.S. v. Dixon, supra. She noted, though, that several factors make this case more difficult. For one thing, this case involves the extraction and seizure of data and private information from a cell phone. A second factor is that the search of the cell phone, while roughly contemporaneous with [Dixon’s] arrest, booking, and interview, was conducted at the agents' offices, outside of [his] presence, after [he] had been taken into custody and removed to another location for booking and interview, and involved much more than just a limited search for the phone's log history or recent calls. Superimposed upon these factors is the fact that Arizona v. Gant was decided in April of 2009 and casts the prior legal authority in a different light. U.S. v. Dixon, supra. As to Gant, she explained that in its opinion, the Supreme Court made it clear that in applying the search incident to arrest exception, it intends to enforce the two original justifications for it, i.e., to disarm the suspect and/or find evidence. She then took up the issues in the case, pointing out that Dixon was not challenging the seizure of the phone; instead, he challenges the search of the phone that was conducted after the arrest, away from the scene of the arrest, outside of [his] presence at the agent's office, where the agent plugged a device into the phone and extracted the data from the phone itself and from its `SD card.’ . . . Recently, at least one circuit court and one state supreme court have addressed similar situations involving seizures and searches of cell phones and have concluded . . . that such a search violates the 4th Amendment. See U.S. v. Wurie, supra; Smallwood v. State, supra. U.S. v. Dixon, supra. The judge found that Arrugueta lawfully seized Dixon’s phone under the search incident exception, but went beyond merely seizing the phone, examining it to ascertain that it was not a weapon, and preserving it. He took it back to his office and extracted all the data he could extract using a data extraction device. This intrusion was more than minimal. U.S. v. Dixon, supra. She therefore found that this was not a case in which there was any threat that the arrestee might use the cell phone as a weapon, in view of the fact that the phone had been immediately seized from him, and, secondly, because it was immediately ascertained that it was not a weapon. Nor is this a case where there was any viable threat that the phone data could be remotely wiped or destroyed. Once the officer had possession of the phone it could be immediately shut off or put in `airplane mode’ and/or its battery removed, effectively eliminating any possibility of such a remote intrusion pending examination of the phone in a controlled environment. . . . There would have been ample time, in other words, for the agents to obtain a warrant, properly limited in scope, assuming the officers had probable cause to justify the search. Furthermore, the privacy interests an individual has in his or her cell phone, given the nature of such phones today, distinguishes it from an individual's wallet, . . . which may be examined immediately upon arrest to confirm identity, among other things, or a briefcase, which may contain a weapon, or other dangerous instrumentality, or destructible evidence. Modern cell phones, like [Dixon’s] Samsung, are in effect mini-computers, and contain contacts, text messages, photographs, calendars, notes and memos, instant messages, voice memos, and e-mail messages—a wealth of private information held within a small digital `container,’ as it were, but a different kind of container from a crumpled cigarette package or even a footlocker. As opposed to a footlocker, or a cigarette pack, which are capable of holding other objects, a cell phone is an integrated digital device that holds only data and digitally stored information. U.S. v. Dixon, supra. She also found that requiring a warrant in these circumstances before such a search may be conducted does not impair the legitimate interests of the government in ensuring the safety of the arresting officers and the preservation of any evidence. These interests were fully protected in this case by immediately taking the phone from [Dixon’s] hands incident to his arrest and securing it. At the same time, by requiring a warrant in this situation for the search of the phone, the legitimate privacy interests of the arrestee can be protected, while still permitting the phone to be immediately seized and preserved pending further action. U.S. v. Dixon, supra. Because the judge found Arrugueta violated Dixon’s 4thAmendment rights “when he took Defendant's cell phone back to his office and searched, downloaded, and extracted all the data he could from it and its storage media”, she granted Dixon’s motion to suppress. U.S. v. Dixon, supra.
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Woman arrested in Fort Collins for alleged drug crimes
Drug charges carry serious consequences. An individual who is convicted of intent to distribute, for example, could face up to 16 years in prison for a first offense. In addition, this felony conviction could have a drastic impact on...
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Jacksonville driver charged with felony for her role in fatal crash
Six months after a fatal wreck on Jacksonville's Westside, the at-fault driver was arrested and charged with vehicular homicide. Tamara Miller was arrested this month after police said she was weaving in and out of traffic, driving more than 30 mph over the speed limit and ran a red light leading to the fatal crash, according to a report in the Florida Times-Union. Miller is charged with vehicular homicide, a second-degree felony punishable by up to 15 years in state prison.
Witness told police they saw Miller veer into a turn lane to go around stopped traffic and then go through a red light and slam into the victim's car about 8:30 a.m. on a June morning, the newspaper reported. It is not uncommon for vehicular homicide investigations to take this long in Jacksonville Traffic Cases such as this one. Vehicular homicide can be difficult for the state to prove and is not simply the default charge in a traffic accident that results in a death. For someone to be convicted of vehicular homicide in a Jacksonville Traffic Case, a death must be "caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another," according to Florida Statutes.
Police told the newspaper that part of the reason for the delay in charges was the wait for investigators to be able to determine the speed at which Miller was driving at the time of the crash. That can be determined by the impact of the crash and other factors, but calculations and other testing is needed so the results are not immediately available. The investigation found Miller was traveling 76 mph on a road with a 45 mph speed limit, which will likely be a key for the state in this Jacksonville Traffic Case. Delays in charges are also common while the state waits for results of toxicology tests that would determine if the driver had any drugs or alcohol in his or her system. In this Jacksonville Traffic Case, police said there was alcohol in Miller's system, but not enough to render her legally impaired. While that detail is something police might want to release to the media, it is something a Jacksonville Criminal Defense Attorney would likely seek to have excluded from a trial, arguing that the amount of alcohol is less that legal limits and it not relevant in this Jacksonville Driving Case.
Very few Jacksonville Traffic Cases end up in vehicular homicide charges, but when the state deems reckless driving results in injuries or death, there can be very serious consequences. In many cases, these are the first serious criminal charges a person has faced though many, like Miller in this case, have a history of traffic violations.
If you or a loved one needs a criminal defense attorney in Jacksonville or the surrounding area, call The Mussallem Law Firm at (904) 365-5200 for a FREE CONSULTATION. Our Duval County Traffic Attorney, Victoria "Tori" Mussallem, is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
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Crash on Fairview Ave. and Hartman St. Blocks Fairview
IDAHO STATE POLICE NEWS RELEASE - generated by our News Release ListServer
DO NOT REPLY
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IDAHO STATE POLICE NEWS RELEASE
District 3 Patrol 700 S. Stratford Dr., Meridian 83642
(208) 846-7550
Fax (208) 846-7520
For Immediate Release: 12/27/13 at 7:20 a.m.
Please direct questions to the District Office
The Idaho State Police are currently investigating a crash on Fairview Ave. and Hartman St., near Curtis Rd. Fairview is still blocked at this time and is not expected to be open until approximately 9:00 a.m., while the crash is being investigated. Motorists are encouraged to avoid the area and advised to take alternate routes. More information will be released as it becomes available.
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Federal Appeals Panel Temporarily Stays Order in Juvenile Lifers' Parole Hearing Requirements
Two days prior to Christmas, a federal appeals court panel signed an order which temporarily stayed an order issued in November by U.S. District Judge John Corbett O'Meara requiring Michigan to give parole hearings to "juvenile lifers," or inmates who are serving mandatory life sentences for offenses committed as minors. This order would have affected some 350 inmates, according to news reports.
In November, Judge O'Meara ordered the state to develop a process for offering parole hearings to these inmates. The deadline for developing the process was December 31. The judge issued the order saying that in the wake of the June 2012 U.S. Supreme Court ruling regarding Michigan's sentencing scheme for juveniles as cruel and unusual punishment, the state had failed to take action.
Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette called the order by the federal appeals court a "Christmas gift" for the families of victims murdered by the inmates who were at the time juveniles. Schuette has been staunchly against offering inmates an opportunity for parole. The Attorney General said in a statement that "I will continue to fight for murder victims and their families who should not be forced to go through unnecessary parole hearings. We will also aggressively defend the authority of state court sentencing judges to object to parole when public safety requires it."
The U.S. Supreme Court struck down mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders in June of 2012, however state and federal courts have not been in agreement regarding whether the ruling should be applicable to inmates who committed murder as juveniles, but who are already in custody.
U.S. Supreme Court justices determined in 2012 that certain sentencing schemes are unconstitutional, such as those for juveniles which to not take into consideration factors such as a young person's potential for cognitive and character development. It was determined that placing juveniles in prison and essentially "throwing away the key" without taking into account factors such as the child's maturity level, age, and circumstances equates to cruel and unusual punishment.
Schuette is appealing Judge O'Meara's order; in the meantime, several of the inmates have brought a lawsuit against Michigan which is being considered by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Should inmates who were ultimately children when they were imprisoned for violent crimes such as murder be incarcerated for their entire lives? This is certainly a topic that has been hotly debated.
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Dollar Bay Man Faces Second-Degree Murder Charges in Domestic Violence Case That Turned Fatal
On December 12, 27-year-old Senaz Nezami died after suffering fatal injuries in a domestic violence assault inflicted by her husband, 34-year-old Nima Nassiri, according to news reports at Upper Michigan's Source.
Nezami was seriously injured in an incident on December 8 in which her husband allegedly assaulted her. Nassiri was charged with assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder on December 9. Following her death, Nassiri was charged with second-degree murder on December 20.
According to news articles, the Houghton County Sheriff's Department began investigating after police received a call notifying them of a possible domestic dispute just before midnight on December 7. Nassiri was taken into police custody at that time, where he remained in the Houghton County Jail on a $5 million bond.
Nassiri's wife was initially taken to Portage Hospital for treatment of her injuries; she was then transported to Marquette General Hospital, where she died on December 12 as a result of her injuries.
At his December 20 court hearing, Nassiri waived his right to a preliminary hearing within 14 days. He is scheduled to be back in court for a preliminary exam on January 13.
As most people know, accusations of murder are extremely serious. While first-degree murder is the most serious offense of all homicides, second-degree murder can also leave the accused facing life behind bars. In the state of Michigan, second-degree murder is considered any murder which is not premeditated, or which may be committed in the commission of a criminal offense including larceny, carjacking, arson, home invasion, and more. Ultimately, an individual found guilty of second-degree murder may face any number of years up to life in prison, as determined by the court.
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Jacksonville Meteorologist Pleads “No Contest” to DUI Charge After Running Stop Sign
Earlier this month, First Coast News meteorologist, Tim Deegan, was stopped by police when he allegedly ran a stop sign. According to a report by the local NBC affiliate, upon stopping Deegan, the officer on the scene conducted a breath alcohol test at some point and discovered that Deegan was driving under the influence of alcohol.
Last week, Deegan entered a “no contest” plea with the court. As a result, Deegan will not go to trail, and will be on probation for one year. In addition, he will have his driver’s license suspended for six months, will be required to complete 50 hours of community service, and will also be required to complete “DUI school.” In addition, Deegann must pay court costs of nearly $1,100.
“No Contest” pleas in Florida Criminal Courts
In the Florida criminal justice system, a no contest plea is not quite a guilty plea but has a similar effect. In essence, a defendant who enters a no contest plea is telling the court “while I am not admitting to committing the offense, I admit that the State has enough evidence to prove that I committed the offense.” The distinction, while slight, is important in a number of ways. To find out more on the distinctions between guilty and no contest pleas, contact an experienced Jacksonville criminal defense lawyer.
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