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UK - Analysing the Child Sex Offender (AUDIO)

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Click to listenListen to the audio here12/11/2012Audio Description: Psychoanalyst and author Susie Orbach (Wikipedia, Twitter) reviews the latest research with experts in the field, to establish how far we understand the psychology of the child sex offender. Research shows that 10% of children (7% of boys, 16% of girls) have been sexually abused. While high profile cases hit the press at intervals - Savile and Rochdale recently, Cleveland and Orkney in the past - the abuse is going on consistently. The evidence shows that most sexual abuse is not committed by high profile offenders, but by family members or acquaintances within the home. Susie Orbach discusses the issue with Anthony Beech, Professor in Criminological Psychology at Birmingham University, consultant clinical psychologist Jackie Craissati, Head of Psychology for Forensic Services with Oxleas NHS Trust, Julia Davidson, Professor in Criminology & Sociology at Kingston University, and James Cantor, Associate Professor in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Toronto. Together they look at who offends and why, whether treatment works, and why society finds the issue so difficult to confront and deal with consistently.© 2006-2012 | Sex Offender Issues

D.S.C.: Under Randolph the police can wait for defendant to leave and ask a joint occupant for consent

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Defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to move to suppress his girlfriend’s written consent. He was removed from the premises on arrest, and the police had no duty under Randolph to seek consent from him. United States v. Swain, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177193 (D. S.C. December 14, 2012). [Yes, the police can wait for their suspect to leave and then seek consent from somebody with apparent authority.] The officer stopped defendants walking on the street because they matched the description of two men who robbed a cell phone store. His lights were one and he commanded them to stop and show their hands with his hand on his gun. That was seizure, and it was with reasonable suspicion. United States v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176658 (D. Mass. December 12, 2012).* Defendant consented to a time-limited search of his cell phone. He was asked for consent, and he said he would except that he wanted the phone back that day so he could use it as an alarm clock the next morning. When asked for clarification, he reaffirmed. The search was by consent. United States v. Weisinger, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177129 (D. Vt. December 11, 2012).*

The Invisible War (Rape In The US Military)

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Web Site | DVDDescription: From Oscar®- and Emmy®-nominated filmmaker Kirby Dick (This Film Is Not Yet Rated; Twist of Faith) comes The Invisible War, a groundbreaking investigative documentary about one of America's most shameful and best kept secrets: the epidemic of rape within the U.S. military. The film paints a startling picture of the extent of the problem-today, a female soldier in combat zones is more likely to be raped by a fellow soldier than killed by enemy fire. The Department of Defense estimates there were a staggering 19,000 violent sex crimes in the military in 2010. The Invisible War exposes the epidemic, breaking open one of the most under-reported stories of our generation, to the nation and the world.Playlist Link© 2006-2012 | Sex Offender Issues

N.D.Ala.: Defendant volunteered consent before he was asked

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In the dashcam video, defendant consented to a search of his vehicle without even being asked, and it was voluntary. United States v. McGowan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177630 (N.D. Ala. October 30, 2012).* The stop of the vehicle was with probable cause, and the officer developed reasonable suspicion that defendant was not legally in the country. The stop was not overlong and was reasonable. United States v. Munoz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177633 (D. S.D. October 10, 2012).* An officer unexpectedly ran into defendant and asked defendant whether he had a gun. It was not in an accusatory tone, and defendant fled. He was not seized at the point the question was asked. United States v. Sanchez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177623 (D. Mass. December 14, 2012).*

(ES) COLOMBIA, PARAÍSO ESCONDIDO

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    ,hi. COLOMBIA, PARAÍSO ESCONDIDO Editorial: Pedi a Nathalia, mi amiga y estudiante de ley que ha trabajdo con esta oficina y que es de Colombia , un pais maravillosa de escribir un blog para mi, para que los de el e.e.e.u. puede saber mucho mas del estereotipo de este pais que no se puede definar con [...]

America, Not Quite A Paradise

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America: Not Quite A Paradise I am writing this blog in response to the excellent blog that Nathalia Siekavizza, wrote, at my request, for this website. Yes , it is true as Nathalia says that when we think of Colombia, most of us think of guns, cocaine, and perhaps the recent scandal in Cartagena. Perhaps [...]

How does an attorney get discovery for your case in South Florida?

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In South Florida and all of its jurisdictions such as Miami, West Palm Beach, Fort Lauderdale, Miami-Dade county, Broward county and Palm Beach county, a criminal case starts with the State putting all the evidence they have together. Now, the defense counsel has the right, under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.220, to view, inspect, and copy all the physical or testimonial evidence that the State will use at trial. How does the attorney do that? The first thing a defense attorney will file is a Notice of Appearance, along with a Written Plea of Not Guilty and a Demand for Discovery. The demand for discovery part will demand the State, under the Rule 3.220, to disclose the evidence they have against the defendant. Choosing a criminal defense attorney is an important decision. If you are being charged with a crime, you should contact an attorney that has enough knowledge and experience to fight for your freedom. Call http://www.ralphbehr.net/an experienced criminal defense attorney in South Florida.

Diehl & Hubbell Welcomes New Associate

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We are pleased to announce that McGuire A. Griffin, a 2012 graduate of the University of Cincinnati, College of Law, has been named as an associate at the law firm of Diehl & Hubbell, LLC.  In November, Mr. Griffin was admitted to the Ohio Bar.  He will have a general practice of law and will represent [...]

Kindstötung: Vorbestrafte Frau bringt erneut eines ihrer Kinder um

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Eine Frau rief einen Notarzt, da ihre 18 Monate alte Tochter nicht mehr atmete. Die Tochter stirbt wenig später im Krankenhaus. Da die Mutter bei der Verabschiedung ihres toten Kindes merkwürdige Äußerungen macht, verständigen die Ärzte die Behörden und obduzierten das Baby. Die Mutter legte daraufhin bei der Polizei ein Geständnis ab. Sie hätte . . . → Read More: Kindstötung: Vorbestrafte Frau bringt erneut eines ihrer Kinder um

IN PRAISE OF PAROLE

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The NY Times profiled four non-violent inmates serving mandatory life sentences. The article is here. Fact: of the 141,000 inmates serving life sentences, 41,000 are serving life with no chance of parole. Why is parole so disfavoured? Don't we trust the professionals who have trained to be in the position to make such a decision? Shouldn't people who are incarcerated be evaluated individually instead of collectively by the crime they were convicted of? Isn't that what this country is about? That each individual has the right to be judged by who they are as an individual, and not as a member of a race or any particular class. And yet with sentencing, we are avowed collectivists, tossing any individuality on to the trash heap of vengeful punishment. Should parole be granted sparingly for some crimes? Sure. But for the incorrigible twenty five year old who keeps getting arrested for serious but non-violent crimes, there should be a  chance at redemption ten, twenty, thirty years later. Not only would the chance at parole motivate prisoners, but it is in keeping with an enlightened society that values individuals and rewards those who make themselves better. The Dolphins looked downright good yesterday. Yes, the blog has a new look. After 2,285 posts, we changed the template to all black on Saturday to mourn the children killed in the horrible tragedy last week in Newton, Connecticut.  Having changed from an old style template, we couldn't go back to our cherished bubbles, so in a way we were forced to upgrade to the new look. Enjoy. Many minutes of thought went into the new look. Seven more shopping days until Christmas; 14 days until we tumble over the fiscal cliff. Last full week of work for the year. See you in court. Site Feed

Two step process explained by Massachusetts OUI lawyer to appeal refusal suspension

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When you refuse a Breathalyzer test in Massachusetts, there is a two-step process to appeal that suspension. The length of the suspension for refusing the Breathalyzer test will depend on the number of prior OUI offenses you have in your...

The Real Problem Is...

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<font style="FONT-SIZE: 12px" face="Arial">The time to mourn will continue, but the cries to fix the problem that took the lives of 20 children in Newtown can no longer be ignored. At a memorial service last night, President Obama, who appeared to be sincere in his resolve to&nbsp;<a href= "http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/us/politics/bloomberg-urges-obama-to-take-action-on-gun-control.html?hpw" target="">do something about mass killings</a> after the fourth in his first term, said:</font> <blockquote><font style="FONT-SIZE: 12px" face="Arial">“Because what choice do we have?” ...</font></blockquote>

Texting While Driving Bill – The Bare Facts

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Two Virginia delegates recently proposed new legislation that would make texting while driving reckless driving. Currently, texting while driving is a secondary offense: a police officer can only cite a driver for texting while driving if he or she pulls the driver over for another offense. And the fine for texting while driving is only [...]

Washington state marijuana legalization comes with bitter pill of DUID conviction risk at 5 nanograms of THC.

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By Jon Katz, a criminal defense lawyer, drug defense lawyer, marijuana defense lawyer, and DWI/ DUI/ Drunk Driving lawyer advocating in Fairfax County, Virginia, Montgomery County, Maryland, and beyond for the best possible results for his clients. http://katzjustice.com  Over the weekend, I learned that last month's Washington state successful marijuana legalization referendum came with the bitter pill of a risk of guilt for driving under the influence of drugs with a THC concentration exceeding five nanograms per milliliter of blood. This information was available before the referendum voting date, but it is not possible for me to catch all essential news amidst the election season blur of Republicans and meat. Here is the Washington state law on driving under the influence of marijuana, which incporates Washington's marijuana legalization referendum language; I copied this statutory language from Westlaw.   Colorado, which also passed a marijuana legalization referendum last month, is also facing possible legislation setting a presumed level of unlawful THC content.  THC ordinarily stays in the bloodstream for over two weeks, which counters any wisdom to setting blood THC concentration levels that presume driving under the influence of drugs.  Moreover, daily medical marijuana users are going to have THC levels in their bloodstream always. The Marijuana Policy Project points to a study showing a 13 nanogram/mL blood THC level in a man who was not impaired. Criminalizing alcohol, THC and other drug levels makes no sense for impaired driving prosecutions, rather than prosecuting for impairment itself. Instead, the alcohol, THC or drug level should, at worst for the defendant, be part of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the driver was unlawfully impaired by alcohol, marijuana or drugs. To do otherwise violates criminal defendants' right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  The MPP article addresses states setting THC blood concentration limits on drivers as follows:  "Nevada and Montana have per se DUID laws. In Nevada, a driver is per se guilty of DUID if the level of THC in his or her blood exceeds two nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL) of blood. In Montana, the per se limit is five ng/mL for patients. In 2011, the Colorado Legislature debated setting a five ng/mL per se limit similar to Montana’s, but decided against it due to a lack of scientific consensus and concerns that many legal medical marijuana users’ blood would exceed the THC limits even when they are not legally impaired." California NORML has an article on the relevance of THC blood content levels to impaired driving here.  One important decision that drunk and drugged driving suspects must make in states that allow them to refuse a breath, blood or urine test for impaired driving, is whether to refuse the test. Where I practice, the loss-of-license risks can be severe for refusing the test where the police officer has sufficient grounds for requesting the test. It is critical to consult a lawyer in advance of an arrest for influenced driving, to help decide whether to take such a test if ever asked to do so. 

Cop vs. Cop

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<font style="FONT-SIZE: 12px" face="Arial">Most dreams of cops, executing a warrant at the home of a family of innocents, fail to produce the outcome we would hope for. A big compensatory award coupled with punitive damages against the cops involved personally. The good news is that it <a href= "http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-10/news/ct-met-cop-raid-verdict-0811-20120811_1_informant-chicago-cop-search-warrant" target="">happened in Chicago</a>.<br> <br></font> <blockquote> <p><font style="FONT-SIZE: 12px" face="Arial">On Friday, a federal jury awarded [Markee] Cooper and his family $565,000 in damages after finding one officer ...</font></p></blockquote>

An Evolving Administrative Law of Targeted Warfare (and the Power of Londoner/BiMetallic)

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Richard H. Pildes & Samuel Issacharoff, Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy Responsibility, New York University School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-40, available at SSRN. Richard MurphyPresident Obama is a Nobel Peace Prize winner. He also orders missile strikes from drones against targeted individuals in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. According to some vocal critics, such extra-judicial killing makes President Obama a murderer. This conclusion rests in large part on the premise that the United States is [...]

Anonymous announces plans to "destroy" Westboro Baptist, releases personal contact information for members

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Hacktivist group Anonymous announced today the start of an attack on Westboro Baptist Church with the release of e-mail addresses, phone numbers, home addresses, and more for over fifty of the church's members. The announcement is in response to Westboro's announced plans to picket funerals in the wake of Friday's school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut. In a video released along with the contact information, the group announced: Since your one-dimensional thought protocol will conform not to any modern logic, we will not debate, argue, or attempt to reason with you. Instead, we have unanimously deemed your organization to be harmful to the population of The United States of America and have therefore decided to execute an agenda of action which will progressively dismantle your institution of deceitful pretext and extreme bias and cease when your zealotry runs dry. We recognize you as serious opponents and do not expect our campaign to terminate in a short period of time. Attrition is our weapon, and we will waste no time, money, effort, and enjoyment in tearing your resolve into pieces as with exposing the incongruity of your distorted faith. What are your thoughts? Is Anonymous's release of personal contact information justified? Or should Westboro's free speech rights protect them from such privacy violations?

NJ: Stop of man merely for being same race as a wanted man was unreasonable; PV warrant found led to search which was suppressed

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Defendant was stopped coming out of an apartment building because he was the same race as a man wanted in an arrest warrant who was thought to be there. Defendant refused to give his name. Parole officers came to the scene and recognized defendant, not as the man wanted, but as a PV. He was searched and drugs were found. The stop of the defendant for merely being the same race as a wanted man, with no other sign of criminality. Under the Brown v. Illinois attenuation factors, this was not attenuated. Applying the exclusionary rule is necessary to protect privacy of the people. The search incident to the PV warrant is suppressed. State v. Shaw, 2012 N.J. LEXIS 1263 (December 13, 2012): Although the exclusionary rule "may vindicate the Fourth Amendment rights of a particular defendant, and more generally the privacy rights of all persons," it also may "depriv[e] the jury or judge of reliable evidence that may point the way to the truth." Id. [State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 16, 926 A.2d 340 (2007)] at 14-15, 926 A.2d 340 (citations omitted). Because of the high price exacted by suppressing evidence, "the exclusionary rule is applied to those circumstances where its remedial objectives can best be achieved." Id. at 15, 926 A.2d 340 (citing Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 348, 94 S. Ct. at 620, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 571). Thus, when law enforcement officials secure evidence that is sufficiently independent of the illegal conduct -- evidence that is not tainted by the misdeed -- then withholding evidence from the trier of fact is a cost that may not be justified by the exclusionary rule. Badessa, supra, 185 N.J. at 311, 885 A.2d 430. . . . Significantly, two of the courts cited above suggested that the random stopping of people in the hope of picking up some on outstanding warrants is the type of flagrant or purposeful conduct that would weigh against a warrant serving as a determinative intervening circumstance. See Brendlin, supra, 195 P.3d at 1082; McBath, supra, 108 P.3d at 249. In Brendlin, supra, the California Supreme Court indicated that where a seizure is "undertaken as a fishing expedition, the third Brown factor will make it unlikely that the [State] would be able to demonstrate an attenuation of the taint of the initial unlawful seizure." 195 P.3d at 1082. The Brendlin court contrasted the "fishing expedition" scenario with "a chance discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant in the course of a seizure that is later determined to be invalid." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Similarly, the Alaska appellate court in McBath, supra, observed that an arrest warrant may not constitute a determinative intervening circumstance "where the police conducted an unjustifiable 'dragnet' investigative stop of many people, hoping to find some for whom there were outstanding arrest warrants." 108 P.3d at 249. In such a case, "the flagrance of the police misconduct may still require suppression of the evidence." Ibid. There is a difference between an unlawful motor vehicle or investigatory stop in which, incidental to the stop, the police learn about an outstanding warrant and, as here, an unlawful stop executed for the specific purpose of ascertaining whether a suspect is the subject of an arrest warrant. That is a point clearly made in People v. Mitchell, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 824 N.E.2d 642, 291 Ill. Dec. 786 (Ill. App. 2005) (cited with approval in Brendlin, supra, 195 P.3d at 1082). People v. Brendlin, 45 Cal. 4th 262, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496, 195 P.3d 1074 (2008) McBath v. State, 108 P.3d 241, 242, 248 (Alaska App. 2005)

mTAN-Betrug: Millionenschäden bei Bankkunden

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Bis zu 36 Millionen Euro sollen mehrere Täter mit Hilfe eines Online-Banking-Trojaners von über 36.000 Bankkunden erbeutet haben. Alleine in Deutschland sollen 13 Millionen Euro an Schaden durch den Betrug entstanden sein. Es sind neben Deutschen aber auch noch Kunden in Italien, Spanien und den Niederlanden betroffen. Die Täter schleusten im ersten Schritt einen . . . → Read More: mTAN-Betrug: Millionenschäden bei Bankkunden

Extortion, Sex and “Thing of Value”

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After a jury convicted him of “four counts of interstate stalking, in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 2261A(2)(A), and two counts of interstate extortionate threat, in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 875(d)”, and the judge sentenced him to “ninety-six months imprisonment”, Jovica Petrovic appealed.  U.S. v. Petrovic, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 6197499 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 2012). He made several arguments on appeal, such as that the stalking charges violated the 1st Amendment and his sentence was improperly enhanced for obstructing justice, but we’re primarily concerned with only one of them: that the district court judgewho presided over his trial improperly instructed the jury on the elements of the § 875(d) extortion charge.  U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. To understand that argument, and the extortion charge, it is necessary to understand how the case arose.  According to this opinion, Petrovic and the victim, M.B.,began a relationship in 2006, married in 2009, and later divorced. During their relationship, Petrovic resided in Florida and M.B. resided in Missouri, where she and her ex-husband, R.B., shared custody of their two young children. Petrovic and M.B. often met in Florida or Missouri, and M.B. occasionally allowed Petrovic to take pictures of her in the nude or performing various sex acts. M.B. also confided in Petrovic, revealing private and intimate information in text messages, such as the sexual abuse M.B. suffered as a young girl, her suicidal thoughts and tendencies, family secrets, and self-doubts about her fitness as a mother. Petrovic saved thousands of these text messages.. . . .In July 2009, M.B. attempted suicide at Petrovic's home after finding evidence leading her to believe [he] was having an extra-marital affair. After M .B. was taken to the hospital for treatment, Petrovic took pictures of the pool of blood that had formed on the floor. In December 2009, [he] took several trips to Missouri to see M.B. During these trips, Petrovic stayed at a local hotel and secretly filmed M.B. having sexual intercourse with him. Petrovic took steps to ensure M.B. was identifiable in the videos. He refused to turn off the lights, removed the sheets from the bed, and directed M.B.'s face and exposed genitalia toward the concealed camera.U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. On December 28, M.B. sent Petrovic a text message in which she said she was ending their relationship. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. He responded with text messages telling her he had secretly recorded their sexual encounters and saved the text messages she had sent him. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. Petrovic said if M.B. did not continue their relationship he would post this information on the Internet so her family could read the messages and see the videos. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. He said he was not “`blackmail[ing]’” her but was “saving the information for his own `protection’”.  U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. He told M.B. to “`be smart.’” U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. Petrovic said she and her family “could soon visit his new website, `www.[M.B.] slut.com.’” U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.  M.B. understood that he intended to “`ruin [her] life’” if she did not “`get back together with [him],’” but still “permanently ended the relationship.”  U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.Over the course of the next few months, Petrovic mailed “dozens of homemade postcards to addresses throughout M.B.'s community,” including to her workplace, to her family members, to R.B.'s home and local businesses like the neighborhood drugstore. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. The postcards typically portrayed a picture of a scantily clad M.B. along with abusive language, such as “`I am just a whore 4 sale’”, and directions to a website, “`www.marriedto[M.B.].com.’” U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. M.B.'s children, other family members and many acquaintances saw the postcards.  U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.. News of the website spread throughout the community, and almost everyone M.B. knew became aware of it.  U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.The site was publicly accessible in March 2010. Petrovic reported [it] was `huge,’ containing `20,000 or 30,000 pages’ of material. . . . [It] contained links to dozens of images of M.B. posing in the nude or engaging in sex acts with Petrovic, and included many from the tapes Petrovic secretly recorded. Visitors . . . could view scores of pictures of M.B.'s children and other family members by clicking on a link next to the pornographic material. . . . Petrovic also posted thousands of pages of text messages M.B. had sent him. The messages were color-coded by speaker and organized chronologically, with the most private and embarrassing messages given special pages. . . . Petrovic posted the pictures of the blood from M.B.'s suicide attempt. . . . Private information about M.B. and her family was also revealed, including M.B.'s contact information and the social security numbers of her children. M.B. did not authorize Petrovic to release any of this information. After learning of the website, M.B. `had a breakdown’ and `wanted to die.’U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.Petrovic also sent packages containing enlarged photographs of M.B. engaging in sex acts with Petrovic to M.B. at her work, to her boss, to her family members, and to R.B.'s home, where M.B.'s seven-year-old child viewed the material. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. In June of 2010, M.B.'s sister was able to have Petrovic's website shut down for a few days. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. On June 20, he “relaunched the site and posted a message stating, `Nobody can stop me to publish this website’” and offering to shut it down if M.B. “gave him his `furniture, what she stoled [sic] from me, the wedding and engagement ring, . . . and $100,000.’” U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. M.B. did not comply and the site remained operational. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra. On July 19, 2010, Petrovic was arrested by United States Postal Inspectors. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.As noted above, on appeal Petrovic claimed his convictions for stalking should be set aside because they violated his right to free speech under the 1st Amendment.  U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.  In ruling on this argument, the Court of Appeals noted that when a 1st Amendment argument is raised in a context involving the public disclosure of facts about private persons, it applies the standard it had enunciated some years ago, in Coplin v. Fairfield Public Access Television Comm., 111 F.3d 1395 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit 1997):`[A]bsent a compelling state interest,’ such speech `can be regulated ... because of its constitutionally proscribable content only if: (1) any such regulation is viewpoint-neutral; (2) the facts revealed are not already in the public domain; (3) the facts revealed about the otherwise private individual are not a legitimate subject of public interest; and (4) the facts revealed are highly offensive.’U.S. v. Petrovic, supra (quoting Coplin v. Fairfield Public Access, supra.)It found that Petrovic’s stalking convictions did not violate the 1st Amendment because (i) “M.B. was a private individual, and Petrovic's communications revealed intensely private information about M.B.”, (ii) “the intimately private facts and photographs revealed by Petrovic were never in the public domain before [he] began his campaign to humiliate M.B.”, (iii) “ the public has no legitimate interest in the private sexual activities of M.B. or in the embarrassing facts revealed about her life” and (iv) “the information Petrovic publicized to the community was highly offensive.”   U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.The Court of Appeals then addressed Petrovic’s challenge to his conviction for extortion in violation of 18 U.S. Code § 875(d). U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.  It noted that to beconvicted under the interstate extortionate threat statute, Petrovic must have intended to extort from M.B. `any money or other thing of value.’ 18 U.S. Code § 875(d). The district court instructed the jury, over Petrovic's objection, that a `sexual relationship’ could constitute a `thing of value under § 875(d). Petrovic maintains this was error that caused him to be improperly convicted of one charge of violating § 875(d) for his December 28, 2009 communications in which Petrovic threatened to harm M.B.'s reputation if she ended their relationship. U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.  (The court explains in a footnote that Petrovic did not “similarly challenge his conviction for the second charge of violating § 875(d) for his June 20, 2010 communications in which he threatened” to keep the site operational until M.B. returned described property and paid him $100,000, “presumably because the described property and the $100,000 clearly constitutes `money or other thing of value’ under the statute.” U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.)The Court of Appeals began its analysis of Petrovic’s argument by explaining that`Congress'[s] frequent use of “thing of value” in various criminal statutes has evolved the phrase into a term of art which the courts generally construe to envelop[ ] both tangibles and intangibles.’ U.S. v. Nilsen, 967 F.2d 539 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit 1992). Petrovic concedes a `thing of value’ under § 875(d) includes intangible objectives. Numerous intangible objectives have been held to constitute things of value under a variety of other statutes, including romantic pursuits and sex-related consideration. See U.S. v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 2011) (sexual favors); U.S. v. Kulla, 434 F. App'x 268 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit 2011) (per curiam) (`the time and attention’ of a younger woman with whom defendant `pursue[d] a romantic relationship); U.S. v. Owens, 585 F.3d 1055 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit2009) (anticipation of future sexual encounters); U.S v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 1996) (conjugal visits); see also U.S. v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit 1979) (listing precedents construing a `thing of value’ to include amusement, sexual intercourse or the promise of sexual intercourse, a promise to reinstate an employee, an agreement not to run in a primary election, or the testimony of a witness). . . .U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.  It found that the holdings in these casesreflect the principle that value is a subjective, rather than objective, concept where `the focus of the . . . term is to be placed on the value which the defendant subjectively attaches’ to what is sought to be received. U.S. v. Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299 (U.S.Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit 1986). . . . Although these cases differ in procedural postures and involve different statutes than does the present case, we see no reason why a `thing of value’ under § 875(d) is more narrow than what the broad term of art encompasses in other contexts. A defendant can attach value to a `sexual relationship’ just as readily as to sexual intercourse or other sex-related considerations, and a `sexual relationship’ may be an intangible `thing of value’ one intends to extort under § 875(d). The district court did not err by instructing the jury that a “sexual relationship” could be a `thing of value’ under § 875(d).U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.  For these and other reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed Petrovic’s convictions and sentence.  U.S. v. Petrovic, supra.  If you’d like to read a little more about the case and see a photo of Petrovic, check out the news story you can find here
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