The court rejects a broad search term on defendant’s supervised release because of his multiple arrests for driving on a suspended license. The search term doesn’t serve any governmental interest. United States v. Postell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187797 (S.D. Ohio December 5, 2012).*
The color of the vehicle the officers were looking for was close enough to the one stopped when they had reasonable suspicion; teal or green? Under the circumstances, they “would be remiss” if they didn’t stop it. United States v. Stile, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58266 (D. Me. January 2, 2013)*:
In criminal investigations parlance, reasonable suspicion lies between "inarticulate hunches," Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, which cannot justify investigatory stops, and probable cause, which can justify searches and arrests. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1979); Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-74. "Reasonable suspicion, then, is an intermediate standard—and one that defies precise definition." Jones, 700 F.3d at 621 (quoting United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001)). Much like the color teal, reasonable suspicion is best understood in reference to the more easily recognized standards it rests between.
↧