Defendant’s house was searched under a state search warrant starting at 9:05 pm. Officers came back and searched again early the next morning. In these circumstances, the second search was a continuation of the first. United States v. Pape, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184063 (D. Minn. December 10, 2012):
The Eighth Circuit, citing the Sixth Circuit, has previously explained that "entries onto premises on successive days pursuant to a single warrant" are not necessarily illegal when "[t]he authority of the warrant ha[s] not expired and ... the return search [is] not beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment." See United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 1965), ...). In Carter, the police had executed a search of the defendant's hotel room pursuant to a valid search warrant obtained based on information police had gathered from an earlier, consented entry into the hotel room. 854 F.2d at 1104-1105. After one of the officers presented the defendant with an inventory list of the items seized from the hotel room, the defendant informed the officer that "$4,000 hidden under the mattress had been omitted." Id. at 1105. The police then returned to the hotel and seized the cash. Id. In rejecting the defendant's challenge to the "return search," the court explained that "the question [was] not whether there were two entries pursuant to the warrant, but rather, whether the second search was a continuation of the first," and found the search proper because "the warrant listed money as an item to be recovered and the search took place several hours later." Id. at 1107 (citing United States v. Huslage, 480 F. Supp. 870, 875 (W.D. Pa. 1979)).
In Bowling, upon which the Eighth Circuit relied in Carter, the police had executed a search warrant at approximately 6:15 p.m. on April 2, 1963, as part of which they recorded serial numbers for numerous items but seized only one. 351 F.2d at 240. After having cross-referencing the serial numbers acquired from the defendant's residence with police lists of stolen equipment, the officers returned the next morning with a truck and seized and removed other machines from the defendant's basement. Id. In rejecting the defendant's argument that the search was improper, the court explained that "certainly the mere fact that the time of [the search warrant's] first use was promptly noted thereon did not vitiate its powers as of the following morning." Id. at 241.
Similarly, in Huslage, upon which the Eighth Circuit also relied in Carter, the police conducted an initial search of the defendant's vehicle at approximately 4:10 a.m. on July 9, 1979, during which they did not seize any evidence. Huslage, 480 F. Supp. at 874. Although the warrant, by its terms, had to be served by 5:00 a.m., at approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning, after the victim of the crime the defendant was charged with provided that she had seen the pistol in the defendant's vehicle, the police conducted a second search of the vehicle. Id. "Aided by natural light," the police found the pistol they were seeking in the vehicle. Id. In rejecting the defendant's argument that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights, even though the Court found that the warrant according to its terms had expired, the court held that
the fact that the police made two entries into the [vehicle] pursuant to a single search warrant does not require a finding that the police violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendants. The question is not whether the police went through the door of the vehicle twice, but rather, whether the search conducted at 10:00 A.M. was a continuation of the search that had been initiated at 4:10 A.M.
Id. at 875 (citing Bowling, 351 F.2d at 241). It emphasized that the second search was made within nine hours of when the search warrant was issued and within twelve hours after the police had arrested the defendants and "[t]he probable cause supporting the search had not become stale." Id.
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