When most people think of drug trafficking charges in Florida, they think of people selling large quantities of marijuana, cocaine or other illegal drugs in traditional drug deals. However, with prescription drugs being the focus of police more and more, drug trafficking cases can involve many different scenarios. First, drug trafficking does not just mean selling or moving a large amount of drugs. Drug trafficking can also include merely possessing drugs over a certain threshold weight. Also, particularly with pill cases, a person really does not need to possess a great deal of pills to be at risk for a drug trafficking charge.
Medical doctors have also been the subject of drug trafficking investigations. In a recent drug trafficking case near Jacksonville, Florida, a medical doctor was charged with multiple counts of drug trafficking for providing Oxycodone to patients without a proper medical evaluation. The law allows a doctor to prescribe and dispense controlled substances such as painkillers like Hydrocodone in the normal course of his/her professional medical practice. However, if the state believes that a doctor is prescribing or dispensing controlled substance pills in an improper manner, such as without a proper medical evaluation or to people who do not need them or to known addicts in excess, the state may bring criminal charges against the doctor. We have seen this happen quite often in certain pain clinic cases in the Jacksonville and South Georgia areas.
In those cases, the state can charge a properly licensed medical doctor with trafficking in drugs or other drug-related crimes. The doctor can defend him/herself by arguing that the drugs were prescribed in the normal course of his/her medical practice. These cases can be difficult for the state to prove. After all, it is the educated and experienced doctor who normally decides issues related to a proper evaluation, diagnosis and treatment plan, not a police officer or prosecutor. On the other hand, drug trafficking charges in Florida come with severe penalties so there is a lot at stake (a felony conviction, loss of a medical license and prison time), and such cases must be defended appropriately
Medical Doctor in Florida Can Be Charged With Drug Trafficking for Improperly Prescribing Drugs
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The Blue Corn
J. K. Rowling, in Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire, said, Understanding is the first step to acceptance, and only with acceptance can there be recovery. Recently, The New York Times had an interesting article – “Monkeys Are Adept at Picking Up Social Cues, Research Shows” – about the transmission of culture in monkeys. Since I’m going […]
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Top-Ten Recent SSRN Downloads
in criminal law and procedure ejournals are here. The usual disclaimers apply. RankDownloadsPaper Title 1 909 Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion Elizabeth E. Joh, U.C. Davis School of Law, Date posted to database: June 26, 2013 2...
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The said victim is deaf and illiterate, but able to read lips
This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered March 16, 1967, convicting him of attempted grand larceny in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. A Kings Grand Larceny...
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The grade of the offense would have been that of petit larceny; with the amendment allowed,
A Kings Criminal Lawyer said that, the People move for an order amending the indictment pursuant to the provisions of Section 200.70 of the Criminal Procedure Law. The indictment contains three counts. The first count accuses the defendant of the...
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TX7: Pre-Jones GPS placement with only RS on court order held valid
Texas statute permitted placement of a GPS device on reasonable suspicion prior to Jones, when this was one placed on defendant’s car. No court had ever held, prior to now, that the reasonable suspicion standard was too low and probable cause was required. Therefore, the good faith exception would be applied. It also did not matter that the vehicle would be driving to New Mexico. Taylor v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10923 (Tex. App. – Amarillo August 28, 2013).
The consent to search was shown to be voluntary, and the owner as passenger gave it. The search did not exceed the scope of consent. $5,000 in United States Currency v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 11118 (Tex. App. – Waco August 29, 2013).*
Officers’ entry into the common area of a University of Kentucky fraternity house to do a knock-and-talk on a single room did not violate defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Milam v. Commonwealth, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 131 (August 30, 2013).
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Nurse Practitioner Bill Suffers A Setback in California
Nurse practitioners in California suffered a setback in their ability to practice independently of physicians if they are part of a medical team such a clinic or group practice. On August 30, 2013, Senate Bill 491 (Hernandez), which would remove patient barriers to health care services by permitting nurse practitioners in California to practice to the full extent of their training and expertise was held in the Assembly Appropriations Committee. The bill was not voted upon and will not move during this legislative session. The California Medical Association vigorously opposed this bill. The Los Angeles Times' article on SB 491 provides more background on the lobbying and issues present. Under current law, NPs have a difficult time providing services at the point of care because of requirements for physician approval to initiate or continue care that patients need. This bill would increase autonomy for NPs to be able to provide this care. The California Association for Nurse Practitioners viewed SB 491 as especially important with the coming implementation of the Affordable Care Act, and the expected influx of up to 7 million new patients into the health care delivery system in California. The Los Angeles Times wrote an article indicating that this is a step in the right direction.The argument in favor of the bill was that NPs would not be performing outside of their level of education and training, but would be utilized to their full practice potential without the archaic and restrictive barriers that prevent patients from receiving high quality, effective care. In addition, 18 other states and the District of Columbia permit autonomous delivery of primary care services by nurse practitioners. We can expect to see a revised bill presented next year regarding expanding the use of nurse practitioners in clinic and group practice settings.Posted by Tracy Green, Green and Associates, Attorneys at LawYou can reach Ms. Green at tgreen@greenassoc.com or 213-233-2260
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Charged with a New Jersey DWI-DUI? A Valid Traffic Stop is Just One Aspect
Quite often when speaking to potential clients, I and the trial attorneys on my legal team are asked how a motorist could possibly fight a drunk driving charge when the police have evidence, such as a breathalyzer test or a seized open container of alcohol, to show the court. Before getting too far ahead of themselves we usually remind these individuals that there are several important aspects to a DWI defense.
As New Jersey drunken driving lawyers, my firm has decades of collective experience protecting the rights of motorists from all walks of life as they face charges of driving while intoxicated by alcohol or operating a motor vehicle while impaired by prescription drugs. One of the more important facts that must be established before a DWI-DUI case can go forward is whether or not the initial traffic stop was performed in the proper manner.
When it comes to defending someone accused of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the question of whether the traffic stop, which usually comes prior to a DWI or drug DUI arrest, was valid to begin with. If it was, then there must be evidence of intoxication from alcohol, cocaine, marijuana or prescribed meds. If the traffic stop was not based on an observed traffic offense or other action that would give an officer the right to pull the motorist over, then it is likely that a skilled attorney can use this fact to his client's advantage.
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Body-worn IMSI catcher takes covert phone snooping to next level
IMSI catchers, known more commonly by the biggest selling trade name, "Stingray" devices," are fake cell-phone towers that police use to capture nearby cell traffic and fool it into running calls through a police-operated device small enough to deploy in a squad car. Now they're big enough to wear as clothing.ACLU's Chris Soghoian described the feds' deployment of Stingray-type technology (that's a trade name, the technical term is "IMSI catcher") worn by law enforcement as a vest at the conference on Location Tracking and Biometrics, an event Grits attended at the Yale Law School, thanks to with reader support) earlier this year, which was the first I'd heard of it. Now we learn more about the body-worn tech in a new report from Ars Technica ("The body worn 'IMSI catcher' for all your covert snooping needs," Sept. 1), which opened:Recently leaked brochures advertising next generation spy devices give outsiders a glimpse into the high-tech world of government surveillance. And one of the most tantalizing of the must-have gizmos available from a company called GammaGroup is a body-worn device that surreptitiously captures the unique identifier used by cell phones. "The unit is optimized for short range covert operation, designed to allow users to get close to Target(s) to maximize the changes of only catching the Target(s') identities and minimal unwanted collateral," one of the marketing pamphlets boasts. "The solution can be used as a standalone device or integrated into wider data-gathering and geo-tracking systems." At just 41 x 33 x 18 centimeters, the device is small enough to fit under a shirt. It needs from one to 90 seconds to capture the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) or international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) of the person being tracked. It works on all GSM-based networks regardless of country and is fully operational even when functioning in a moving vehicle. The same brochure advertises several other varieties of IMSI catchers, including some that work in a totable briefcase and one that receives signals from a covert vehicle roof bar antenna. The James Bond spying tools are sold to government agencies and law enforcement organizations.Soghoian described experiments by the feds having agents with body-worn IMSI vests walking through crowds at political rallies and recording the ID of every cell phone that pinged,. That gave them a lot of baseline data about who was at the event, how to target their phone if need be in the future, etc., Combined with the rise of license plate readers, continued warrantless access to historic location data (at least for now), a national facial recognition database about to come online, and near ubiquitous surveillance in most public places, the potential uses and misuses of such more-or-less unregulated police technology boggles the mind.Read the whole thing.
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A Ponzi of A Different Color
High profile schemes perpetrated by Bernie Madoff, Allen Stanford, Nevin Shapiro, and others have brought, or at least reinforced, a general understanding of the term “Ponzi scheme” into the public lexicon. But what, legally, is a Ponzi scheme? In SEC Read More
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"Restoration, Retribution, or Revenge? Time Shifting Victim Impact Statements in American Judicial Process"
The title of this post is the title of this intriguing looking new paper by Tracy Hresko Pearl now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract: Courts currently permit victims to offer victim impact statement in criminal proceedings in all...
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Michigan Driver's License Restoration Lawyer - Clinical and Legal Training - Part 1
In the Michigan driver's license restoration section of my website, and within the more than 200 driver's license restoration articles on my blog, I analyze and examine virtually every facet of what it takes for a person to win a...
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Case o' The Week: Ninth Shuts District Court Gate(keeping) - Evans, FRE 104 and FRE 403
“[T]he prosecution has independent evidence that the defense evidence is as phony as a $3 bill.” United States v. Evans, 2013 WL 4516754, *11 (9thCir. Aug. 27, 2013) (Gould, J., dissenting). Maybe so. Fortunately, the Constitution provides for juries, who – as Judge Paez reminds us – are tasked with the job of weighing such evidence. United States v. Evans, 2013 WL 4516754 (9thCir. Aug. 27, 2013), decision available here.Players: Decision by Judge Paez, joined by Judge Fisher. Dissent by Judge Gould.Facts: Evans was charged with being an alien unlawfully in the U.S., and misrepresenting his identity to apply for benefits and a passport. Id. at *1. The defense was that he was actually a citizen, based on a “delayed birth certificate” issued by the State of Idaho. Id. The district court ordered a pre-trial evidentiary hearing on the certificate’s admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 104. Id. at *2. At the evidentiary hearing the government introduced (a rather substantial amount) of evidence of fraud in the application for the birth certificate. Id. at *2-*3. The district court held that it was “the gatekeeper,” and under FRE 104 and 403 it excluded evidence of the certificate from trial. Id. at *3. Evans was convicted of all charges. Id.Issue(s): “In these consolidated appeals, we clarify the limits of a trial court’s authority under Federal Rules of Evidence 104 and 403 to exclude relevant evidence when the court questions the credibility of such evidence.” Id. at *1. “On appeal, Evans argues that the exclusion of the birth certificate deprived him of his Fifth Amendment due process right to present a defense and his Sixth Amendment right for a jury to determine every element of the charges brought against him.” Id. at *4. Held: “We hold that the district court erred in excluding the birth certificate, and that the exclusion of such significant evidence resulted in a violation of Evan’s Fifth Amendment due process right to present a defense. [T]he error was not harmless, and . . . vacate Evan’s convictions and remand for new trials.” Id. at *1.Of Note: Evans is an important and thoughtful opinion that tackles a question of first impression in the Ninth: does FRE 104’s gatekeeping function to only permit admissible evidence mean “credible” evidence, oradmissible under other Rules of Evidence? Id.at *4. Evans holds that it is the latter: “We conclude that the trial court’s authority to determine if evidence is admissible pursuant to Rule 104(a) is necessarily limited by other rules of evidence – most importantly, Rule 402, which provides that evidence is admissible so long as (1) it is relevant, and (2) it is not other inadmissible under, inter alia, the Federal Ruled of Evidence . . . Thus, Rule 104(a) provides the trial court with the authority to decide questions that make evidence inadmissible under some other rule of evidence (or under the Constitution, a federal statute, or other Supreme Court rules), but it does not itself provide a substantive basis for excluding the evidence.” Id. at *4. “We have not previously considered whether a trial court can exclude evidence pursuant to Rule 104(a) without relying on some substantive basis outside of Rule 104(a), such as another rule of evidence, a federal statute, or the United States constitution. We now hold that it cannot.” Id. at *5. Here, a fact finder could not determine the legitimacy of the birth certificate without making credibility findings. Credibility findings, reminds Judge Paez, are a jury’s job – not the district courts. Id. at *6. Hard on the heels of this great FRE 104 analysis is an equally good FRE 403 discussion, emphasizing that probative weight must be weighed with respect to a material fact making the assumption that “the evidence is believed.” Id. at *6-*7. Evans is strong evidentiary bulwark protecting our right to present a defense – a worthy addition to the trial toolkit.How to Use: Evans’ evidentiary insights are academic without relief. The path to reversal required a constitutional violation – triggering the “high burden” on the government to prove that the error was harmless ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.at *9. Here, the Ninth delivers again. Id.That key finding gives sharp teeth to these evidentiary holdings: emphasize constitutional error when fending off FRE 104 and 403 attacks. For Further Reading: If you’re confused by the new Holder position on mand-mins and how it works in the trenches, you’re in good company. For a useful guide with good links, see a thorough blog entry here.Image of (real!) Civil War era three dollar bill from http://quigon1.tripod.com/civil_war.htmlImage of Attorney General Holder from http://www.slate.com/content/dam/slate/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/130812_JURIS_EricHolderABA.jpg.CROP.rectangle3-large.jpg Steven Kalar, Federal Public Defender N.D. Cal. FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org.
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Defendant T's motion to dismiss indictment 589/97 is granted only as to counts six, seven, and eleven.
This is a proceeding involving two unrelated cases wherein the issue is whether, under constitutional and state statutory double jeopardy principles, a criminal prosecution in the Supreme Court is precluded by a prior Family Court disposition imposed for a violation of an order of protection based on the same underlying conduct.
In People v. Arnold, A's then wife commenced a Family Court proceeding under Article 8 of the Family Court Act. It is her allegation that the defendant argued with her, cursed at her and destroyed her property on 2 April 1995. She also alleged that on prior occasions A had assaulted and threatened her.
A’s wife requested and received an order of protection from the Family Court directing A not to assault, menace, harass, recklessly endanger or engage in disorderly conduct towards her.
Thereafter, A’s wife brought a second petition before the Family Court alleging that A violated the temporary order of protection by forcing his way into his wife's home and by menacing her with a knife and by calling her on the phone and by continually threatening to kill her.
After a fact finding hearing, the Family Court found that petitioner met her "burden of requisite quantum proof." After a dispositional hearing pursuant to § 841 of the Family Court Act, the Family Court placed A on one year probation and required him to attend a batterer's program. The Family Court, finding the presence of aggravating circumstances under Family Court Act § 827(a)(vii) issued a final three year order of protection.
While the Family Court case was pending, A had been arrested and charged with various crimes arising out of incidents alleged. The defendant was indicted for Burglary in the First and Second Degrees, Assault in the Second Degree, Attempted Assault in the Second Degree, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree and Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree, all alleged to have occurred on 15 April 1995; Burglary in the Second Degree, Criminal Contempt in the First and Second Degrees, and Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree, all alleged to have occurred on 25 April 1995; and Burglary in the Second Degree, Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree and Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree, all alleged to have occurred on 26 April 1995.
In People v. Triuck, defendant T's wife obtained a final order of protection in the Family Court after a finding that T menaced his wife with a knife. The final order of protection was for a period of three years and directed that T refrain from acts constituting "assault, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment, disorderly conduct, intimidation or any other offense under the Penal Law" and also provided that he stay away from his wife, her home, and their child.
Thereafter, T's wife brought a petition alleging that T violated the order of protection on various dates. After a fact finding hearing, the Family Court found beyond a reasonable doubt that T willfully violated final order of protection. The court found that T willfully violated the final order of protection by repeatedly pushing his wife, and by forcibly taking custody of the parties' minor child.
The Family Court imposed, as its disposition, consecutive sentences of incarceration for each violation: 90 days each for the violations occurring on 22 October 1996 and 23 October 1996; and 180 days for the 26 October 1996 violation.
The instant indictment was filed against T charging him with Aggravated Criminal Contempt, Criminal Contempt in the First Degree, Endangering the Welfare of a Child, Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree and Menacing in the Third Degree, Criminal Contempt in the First Degree (three counts), Endangering the Welfare of a Child and Custodial Interference in the Second Degree, and Menacing in the Third Degree.
In two separate motions, defendants A and T contend that their Supreme Court prosecutions are barred by constitutional and state statutory double jeopardy protection. It is their contention that the Family Court proceeding against each of them was a prosecution for the same conduct or offense as charged in the respective indictment against each of them which is now before this Court. Moreover, each contends that the disposition or sentence imposed by the Family Court constituted criminal punishment.
Family Court Act §§ 115[e], 812[1] and CPL 100.07, 530.11 both provide the criminal court and family court with concurrent jurisdiction for certain enumerated criminal offenses when committed by one family member against another.
Although the Family Court proceeding for certain criminal conduct among family members is deemed to be a civil proceeding, the Family Court may, with the consent of the petitioner, transfer a § 812 proceeding to the criminal court in the interest of justice. Moreover, the Family Court upon its own motion or upon motion of the petitioner transfer a proceeding to the criminal court alleging that the respondent has failed to obey a lawful order of the court in accordance with Family Court Act §§ 846[b][ii][C]; 813[1].
In North Carolina v Pearce, it was ruled that the constitutional protection against former jeopardy protects individuals against successive prosecutions for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction. Multiple punishments for the same offense are also proscribed. Helvering v Mitchell ruled that double jeopardy protection may be extended to proceedings that are not nominally criminal. United States v Harper, Department of Revenue of Montana v Kurth Ranch, Cordero v Lalor, and United States v Ursery settled that a sanction in a "civil" or non-criminal proceeding may constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has held that an Article 10 proceeding under the Family Court Act to determine whether a child has been neglected or abused does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct under double jeopardy principles.
A child protective proceeding can take place in the Family Court while a criminal prosecution goes forward arising out of the same conduct because of the different purposes of these courts, different standards of proof and dispositional alternatives. There is no double jeopardy bar to a criminal prosecution after an Article 10 Family Court proceeding. Significantly, a neglect or abuse finding can result in the possibility of the child's placement outside the familial home, not a penal sanction against the defendant. The desired end of the article 10 proceeding is to ensure the expeditious protection of the child's welfare, not to secure a conviction against the defendant as held in People v Roselle.
In the case at bar, defendants A and T were subject to a proceeding under Article 8 of the Family Court Act. Article 8 is a civil proceeding for the purposes of attempting to stop the violence, end the family disruption and obtain protection. The Court of Appeals has held, however, that consecutive sentences of imprisonment are permitted for multiple violations of an order of protection due to the punitive nature of Family Court Act § 846-a as held in Walker v Walker. Regardless, the purpose of Article 8 is designed to provide reasonable means and methods of protection and enforcement for victims of domestic violence.
The court notes that a disposition under § 841 of the Family Court Act for a founded violation of an order of protection is punitive and not remedial and thus is for criminal contempt and not civil contempt.
The court must now consider whether the Supreme Court prosecution must be dismissed as violative of the prohibition against double jeopardy where the Family Court has previously found that each defendant had violated the respective Family Court order of protection and punished each defendant for such violation.
The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the Blockburger or "same elements test" for determining whether proceedings against a criminal defendant violate the Double Jeopardy clause. The Supreme Court held that each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The applicable rule to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not based on the rulings in Blockburger v United States.
In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, the Supreme Court has held that where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the same elements test, the double jeopardy bar applies. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the same conduct test.
This Court chooses to apply comparison of two elements- a court order made known to the defendant and willful violation of that order as ruled in Commonwealth v. Yerby.
Applying the same elements test to the first case, it is clear that the Court need consider only the crimes alleged to have occurred on 15 April 1995, stemming from the same incident that was the basis of the Family Court proceeding finding a violation of the protective order.
The crime of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (count 5) is dismissed on Double Jeopardy grounds as the previous proceeding in the Family Court for contempt was criminal and based on the same two elements--knowledge of an existing court order and a willful violation of such order. Although the Family Court's order was minute in finding that the defendant violated the order of protection, the allegations contained in the petition alleging the violation did not include any allegations of assault or burglary as a basis for violating the order of protection. The violation of the protective order was based on an allegation that A forced his way into his wife's home and menaced her with a knife in violation of the order of protection. All the crimes that A is alleged to have committed on 15 April 1995 are not barred by constitutional double jeopardy principles. The crime of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (count 5) is hereby dismissed based on the same elements test.
Similarly in applying the Blockburger test the second case, the Court need only consider the counts alleged to have occurred on 22 October and 23 October 1996, arising from the same incidents that were the basis of the Family Court's finding that T violated the order of protection.
The Criminal Contempt in the First Degree counts of 22 October 1996 all allege in pertinent part that the defendant in violation of an order of protection that the defendant has actual knowledge by virtue of being in Court when such order was issued or by being served with such order, the defendant committed certain acts. The defendant having been found to be in violation of the Family Court's order of protection cannot be tried for the charges of Criminal Contempt in the First Degree occurring on 22 October 1996. Counts six, seven and eleven of the T indictment are dismissed.
Moreover, Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree is a lesser included offense of Criminal Contempt in the First Degree. Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree under the Penal Law contains the same elements as the Family Court Act counterpart. The Supreme Court, relying on Blockburger, has held that a subsequent prosecution for a greater offense after a conviction for a lesser included offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the two are the same statutory offenses. With regard to the counts charging T with Custodial Interference in the Second Degree, a trial for this charge would not violate his "double jeopardy rights". With regard to the menacing charge, the double jeopardy clause would not be violated by trying T.
Defendant T further contends that all charges contained in the indictment should be dismissed as all were joinable in the Family Court proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Law as being based on the same criminal transaction pursuant to CPL 40.40[1] and [2]; 200.10, and 40.10. CPL 40.40[1] provides that if two or more offenses are joinable in a single "accusatory instrument" under CPL 200.20[2], and the prosecution fails to join all those offenses, then a second trial is barred. CPL 1.20[1] defines the term "accusatory instrument". A Family Court petition under § 846 is not an "accusatory instrument" as defined by CPL 1.20. Thus, there existed no "accusatory instrument" in which the counts of this indictment could have been joined.
Contrary to defendant T’s contention, a defendant who testifies to the Grand Jury is not entitled to a Sandoval hearing on his prior misconduct to determine what other offenses may be used on cross-examination. Any prior immoral acts by the defendant may be utilized on cross-examination for impeachment purposes in order to aid in the Grand Jury's determination of the defendant's credibility.
Accordingly, defendant A's motion to dismiss indictment 5167/95 is granted only as to count five. Defendant T's motion to dismiss indictment 589/97 is granted only as to counts six, seven, and eleven.
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Fear Debt Collectors or Fight Back
When talking about debt and debt collectors, most people will talk about the law, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Today I want to talk to you about the emotional impacts of debt. If you are one of the millions of people (1 in 7 Americans) being called and harassed my debt collectors, you know what it feels like when your phone rings or you retrieve your mail. You may experience feelings of anxiety, nervousness or fear. You may imagine the worst case scenario of losing everything you’ve worked for and it’s taking a massive emotional toll on you and your family. The uncertainty of what is going to happen with your debt may lead to sleepless nights. You’re not sure how to navigate the confusing world of debt collection. You don’t know if you should answer the phone or what to say if you do. Having a plan and just a little knowledge can help enormously in bringing some peace to your life. Let’s talk about some of the most common fears in regards to debt collection: Fear: Wage Garnishment. One of the most common fears is wage garnishment, where you may believe the creditor (i.e., a credit card company) can come and take your paycheck for one missed payment. Truth: A company you have a debt with must first sue you and win a judgment against you before they can garnish wages. If they haven’t sued you, they cannot, repeat, cannot garnish your check. Fear: Collection Calls. Every day I hear from people who are being bullied by debt collectors over the phone. They are being called repeatedly at work, at home and on their cell phones. Some people think that they must [...]The post Fear Debt Collectors or Fight Back appeared first on Michigan Consumer Credit Lawyers.
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Garrett on Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices
Brandon L. Garrett (University of Virginia School of Law) has posted Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices: A Virginia Case Study (Forthcoming, 3 Virginia Journal of Criminal Law (2014)) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: Over three decades of social science...
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Second Circuit Rules 10(b) Does Not Apply Extraterritorially
In United States v. Vilar, the Second Circuit examined a post-Morrison decision with an issue of whether Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies to extraterritorial criminal conduct. The government had argued that the Supreme Court's decision...
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INDIA - Woman (Chanchal Rathore) sentenced to four years' jail for levelling false rape charge against landlord
Original Article
09/02/2013
A woman was awarded a sentence of four years and a fine of Rs 11,000 for levelling false rape charges against her landlord, after a dispute over the payment of rent due to which the landlord committed suicide.
The sentence was awarded by Additional Session Judge Indira Singh to Chanchal Rathore (35) under Section 211 (levelling false allegations with an intention to cause hurt) and Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code (giving false information to a public...
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Labor Day Open Thread
Happy Labor Day. (Version with Axl Rose here.)
Lets drink to the hard working people
Lets drink to the lowly of birth
Raise your glass to the good and the evil
Lets drink to the salt of the earth
Congratulations to Diana Nyad. At 64,...
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Biber on the Cultural Afterlife of Criminal Evidence
Katherine Biber (University of Technology Sydney, Faculty of Law) has posted In Crime's Archive: The Cultural Afterlife of Criminal Evidence (British Journal of Criminology, (advance access) August 13, 2013) on SSRN. Here is the abstract: This article explores the cultural...
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